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Executive Summary 
 
It is no secret that the fight against desertification isn't going well. In the two decades since the 
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification came into force, desertification has 
worsened considerably. Many within the desertification community and beyond are calling for a 
fresh approach to the problem: the establishment of a global goal to achieve a "land-
degradation neutral world" (LDNW). However, the call for land degradation neutrality has not 
been universally celebrated, particularly given the questionable track record of past "no net 
loss" policies.  
 
In this paper, the authors explore ways to advance global land degradation neutrality into a 
concept — and, eventually, a program — that has legal and scientific integrity, such that it 
delivers tangible gains. The paper draws on lessons learned from two ongoing, land-centered 
policy attempts similarly framed around goals of “neutrality”: the "no net loss" wetlands policy 
embraced by the United States' Wetlands Mitigation Banking (WMB) program, as 
representative of a broad class of "biodiversity offset" programs emerging around the world; 
and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD), an international 
program aimed at preserving, enhancing, and restoring forests as carbon "sinks."  
 
The paper finds that three key issues emerge for further consideration on the path to a "land-
degradation neutral world": (1) how to define and measure the problem — "land degradation" 
— in scientifically and legally meaningful ways; (2) how to successfully pursue "neutrality" as an 
organizing principle; and (3) how to balance the local and the global, and the public and the 
private, in the administration of such a program. The paper concludes that neither WMB nor 
REDD’s experience allows for enthusiastic endorsement of “neutrality”-framed land 
management programs, but suggests that these efforts may have laid the groundwork or the 
next generation of such programs to proceed with greater knowledge of how to design with 
integrity, for success. It asserts that LDNW’s best hopes for success will lie in early, honest 
conversations that achieve reasonable clarity in program aims, coupled with metrics that 
accurately capture these aims and a willingness to allow pluralistic experimentation during early 
stages of implementation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is no secret that the fight against desertification isn’t going well.  In the two 
decades since the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) came into 
force,1 desertification—defined as degradation in the quality of “arid, semi-arid, and dry 
subhumid” land areas2—has worsened considerably. Recent United Nations estimates 
suggest that 52% of drylands currently under agricultural cultivation are moderately or 
severely degraded, and 12 million hectares of productive land become barren each year due 
to desertification and drought.3 And while drylands are the focus of the UNCCD, the 
challenge isn’t limited to them: somewhere around twenty percent of land worldwide is 
moderately or severely degraded and most experts predict this percentage will increase in 
coming decades.4   
In the face of these numbers and trends, many within the desertification community 
and beyond are calling for a fresh approach to the problem: the establishment of a global 
goal to achieve a “land-degradation neutral world.”5  This goal gained considerable traction 
after it was included in the outcome document of the 2012 United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development, better known as the “Rio+20” Conference. 6   The UNCCD 
Secretariat has since proposed that the world adopt the more concrete goal of “Zero Net 
                                                        
1
 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought 
and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, June 17, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1328 [hereinafter UNCCD]. 
2
 Id. art. 1(a). These arid, semi-arid, and dry subhumid areas, which are often collectively referred to as 
drylands, “cover approximately 40% of the world’s land area, and are most prevalent in Africa and Asia. See 
United Nations Environment Management Group, Global Drylands: A UN System-Wide Response, at 15 (2011).  
3
 See UNCCD SECRETARIAT POLICY BRIEF, ZERO NET LAND DEGRADATION: A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOAL FOR RIO +20, 13 
(May 2012) (hereinafter “ZNLD BRIEF”); UNCCD SECRETARIAT, DESERTIFICATION, THE INVISIBLE FRONTLINE 4 (2014).  It is 
worth noting, however, that definitional and measurement differences in desertification abound—a problem 
discussed in more detail infra section II.a, and that some of the acres rendered barren each year due to 
drought may naturally return to a productive state. 
4
 See ZNLD Brief, at 3; see also Technical Support Team of the UNCCD, Issues Brief: Desertification, Land 
Degradation and Drought, at 8 (2012) (citing Bai ZG et al., Global assessment of land degradation and 
improvement, Identification by remote sensing, Report 2008/01, ISRIC—World Soil Information); MILLENNIUM 
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELLBEING, DESERTIFICATION SYNTHESIS 1 (2005). 
5
 See, e.g., ZNLD BRIEF; U.N. General Assembly, Res. 66/288: The Future We Want: Outcome Document of the 
U.N. Conference on Sustainable Development,  Para. 206, 11 Sept. 2012 : see also Pamela Chasek et al., 
Operationalizing Zero Net Land Degradation: The next stage in international efforts to combat desertification?, 
30 J. ARID ENVTS. 1, 1 (2014) (noting the need for urgent action to reverse land degradation). 
6
 U.N. General Assembly, Res. 66/288: The Future We Want: Outcome Document of the U.N. Conference on 
Sustainable Development, Para. 206, 11 Sept. 2012 [hereinafter “Rio+20 Outcome Document”]. The “Rio+20” 
nickname stems from the fact that the 2012 conference occurred 20 years after the first Earth Summit, also in 
Rio de Janeiro, in 1992. See UN Conference on Environment and Development (1992), U.N. (May 23, 1997), 
http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html (last visited May 28, 2014).  
 2 
Land Degradation by 2030.”7  As the UNCCD has explained, this “neutralizing” of land 
degradation would come about through “a global shift in land stewardship such that 
degradation of new areas is avoided, and unavoidable degradation is offset by restoring an 
equal amount of already degraded land in the same time and in the same ecosystem.”8 
Few would argue with the goals of slowing land degradation and restoring degraded 
land where possible.  And there is obvious rhetorical appeal to the “land-degradation 
neutral world” slogan, as it lends specificity to a problem that has proven challenging to 
measure and manage.9 The frame of “neutrality” may also be gaining appeal due to the 
proliferation of domestic “no net loss” targets in biodiversity offsetting programs, as well as 
the push for “carbon neutrality” within the realm of climate change policy.10  However, the 
call for land degradation neutrality has not been universally celebrated. One major reason 
for this resistance is that it remains unclear how this goal might be translated from an 
aspirational objective that sounds good in the abstract, into concrete actions with verifiable 
outcomes. In particular, it is not clear whether the concept can be imbued with legal and 
scientific integrity so that it becomes more than just a “platitude.”11 Indeed, in examining 
previous pushes for land neutrality, some scholars have posited that “no net loss” policies 
may be no more than “an effective political diversion,” erecting “an illusion that crumbles 
under scrutiny from ecological and political science.”12 
This article looks at ways to avoid these risks and to advance global land degradation 
neutrality into a concept—and, eventually, a program—that has legal and scientific 
integrity, such that it delivers tangible gains. We do so by turning backwards to move 
forward, drawing on lessons learned from two ongoing, land-centered policy attempts 
similarly framed around goals of neutrality: the “no net loss” wetlands policy embraced by 
the United States’ Wetlands Mitigation Banking (WMB) program, as representative of a 
broad class of “biodiversity offset” programs emerging around the world; and Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), an international program 
aimed at preserving, enhancing, and restoring forests as carbon “sinks.” These examples 
                                                        
7
 See UNCCD, A STRONGER UNCCD FOR A LAND-DEGRADATION NEUTRAL WORLD, Issue Brief, at 7 (2013) [hereinafter “A 
STRONGER UNCCD”]. 
8
 Press Release, UNCCD, Global conference steps up action to move to a land-degradation neutral world, 15 
November 2012; see also A STRONGER UNCCD, supra note 7, at 9. 
9
 As the UNCCD Secretariat has explained, the vision of land-degradation neutrality “is strikingly clear and easy 
to communicate.” A STRONGER UNCCD, supra note 7, at 7. 
10
 See infra Parts 3-4 for more details on these programs. 
11
 See Introductory Remarks, UNCCD Expert Working Group on A Land Degradation Neutral World, July 2013, 
available at 
http://www.unccd.int/en/programmes/RioConventions/RioPlus20/Pages/LDNW-Expert-Meeting.aspx.  
12
 Susan Walker et al., Why bartering biodiversity fails, CONSERVATION LETTERS 2:149-157, 154 (2009). 
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provide potential frameworks for progress, but also act as harbingers of some of the 
challenges that land degradation neutrality may encounter in moving from theory to 
practical implementation.  Three key issues emerge for further consideration on the path to 
a “land-degradation neutral world” (LDNW): (1) how to define and measure the problem—
“land degradation”—in scientifically and legally meaningful ways; (2) how to successfully 
pursue “neutrality” as an organizing principle; and (3) how to balance the local and the 
global, and the public and the private, in the administration of such a program.  Each of 
these issues exists at the nexus of science and law, and they are interrelated in ways that 
we parse in our discussion.   
Little academic attention has yet been paid to the concept of land degradation 
neutrality. The lack of scholarship to date is unsurprising given the goal’s recent emergence. 
There is, however, urgency to understanding how land-degradation neutrality might 
proceed and the degree to which it should be embraced, as it is currently under 
consideration for inclusion as one of the United Nation’s post-2015 “Sustainable 
Development Goals” (SDGs).13  These goals have historically played an important role in 
helping shape the international community’s development agenda and funding priorities,14 
such that embracing land degradation neutrality as an SDG might have major practical 
consequences.  Furthermore, there is also an active debate regarding how to move forward 
within the UNCCD, and how the Convention might fit (or not fit) with the broader goal of 
LDNW.15  Fleshing out the concept of LDNW may also produce insights relevant to both of 
                                                        
13
 See Sustainable Development Goals, United Nations Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, 
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1300 (last visited April 11, 2014).  One main outcome 
of the Rio+20 Conference was that member States agreed to a process to develop a set of Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), which will build upon the Millennium Development Goals and converge with the 
post 2015 development agenda.  A UN Working Group is tasked with developing a draft set of goals for 
presentation to the UN General Assembly in 2014.  See Sustainable Development Goals, United Nations, 
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1300; Progress report of the Open Working Group of 
the General Assembly on Sustainable Development Goals, ¶¶ 54-55 (observing that “[h]alting and reversing 
land degradation will be critical to meeting future food needs,” while also questioning “whether the objective 
is sufficiently ambitious, given the current extent of land degradation globally and the potential benefits from 
land restoration not only for food security but also for mitigating climate change”); see also Chasek et al., 
supra note 5, at 1.  
14
 Pamela S. Chasek, Follow the Money: Navigating the International Aid Maze for Dryland Development, J. OF 
INTL. ORG. STUDIES, Vol. 4, Issue 1: 77, 88 (2013) (noting that the UNCCD has tried to “bandwagon” with the 
Millennium Development Goals to increase funding); see also Elina Andersson et al., The Political Ecology of 
Land Degradation, 36 ANNUAL REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES 295, 308 (2011) (“Changes in the dominant development 
discourse can be traced to the endorsement of the Millennium Declaration by the UN member states in 2000, 
which shifted the focus from fostering economic growth per se to encouraging ‘pro-poor growth’ and 
increasingly incorporating environmental concerns in the development process.” (internal citations omitted)).  
15
 See UNCCD, Decision 8/COP.11, Follow-up to the outcomes of the United Nations Conference on 
Sustainable Development (Rio+20) (September 2014) (creating an intergovernmental working group to “(1) 
establish a science-based definition of land degradation neutrality in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas; 
(2) develop options relating to arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas that Parties might consider should they 
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these discussions, as well as to the ongoing debate about how combating land degradation 
might play a role in future international climate mitigation regimes.16      
We are cautiously optimistic about the promise that the LDNW framework holds for 
reorienting thinking and action around the problem of land degradation, provided that the 
implementation process is executed thoughtfully.  Most importantly, the accountability 
created by an LDNW framework could help generate better outcomes and increased 
funding for actions to prevent and reverse land degradation.  It also could be used as the 
impetus for altering national legal baselines to require restoration as a condition of private 
development within the country. More broadly, it may empower pluralistic experimentation 
on land degradation management and measurement models.    Ultimately, however, this 
article raises more questions than answers—an appropriate move at this early stage of 
LDNW development.  In particular, we argue that WMB and REDD+ flag important concerns 
about the relationship between program goals and the definitions and measurements 
derived therefrom; about the challenges of using “neutrality” as an organizing framework; 
and about the appropriate scale of the program and the appropriate actors to involve in 
order to attract funding while preserving the integrity of the program’s original goals. For 
LDNW, the key takeaway is that early, thoughtful, inclusive design discussions will be of 
paramount importance in heading off some of these issues and creating a program that 
delivers real results to people struggling to cope in marginalized lands.   
This article proceeds in five parts. Part II provides scientific background on land 
degradation and explores the genesis and current status of the LDNW goal. Part III describes 
the structure of, and key challenges faced by, the WMB and REDD+ programs.  With this 
background, Part IV moves on to examine the lessons that LDNW can learn from these past 
attempts at designing a land management program framed in terms of “neutrality.”  Part V 
concludes the discussion.   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
strive to achieve land degradation neutrality; and (3) advise the Convention on the implications for its current 
and future strategy, programmes and the resource requirements”); see also Chasek et al., supra note 5, at 1.  
16
 While the current Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change restricts 
participation of land use mitigation credits to the forestry sector, and even severely circumscribes their use 
within this sector, see infra note 181, many commentators have suggested that land use mitigation activities 
might play a larger role in future regimes. See, e.g., Gillian A. Cerbu, Brent M. Swallow & Dara Y. Thompson, 
Locating REDD: A global survey and analysis of REDD readiness and demonstration activities, 14 ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 168, 169 (2011) (noting that REDD+ is spurring movement towards including “net negative changes in 
carbon stocks across all lands and land uses” within future international compliance mechanisms); Ingrid J. 
Visseren-Hamakers et al., Trade-offs, co-benefits and safeguards: current debates on the breadth of REDD+, 4 
CURRENT OPINION IN ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY 1, 4 (2012) (noting complex tensions over whether to broaden REDD+ 
beyond forests to include agriculture).  
 5 
II. GENESIS AND STATUS OF LDNW GOAL 
a. Understanding Land Degradation 
i. Defining the Term 
 In striving for land-degradation neutrality, it is first necessary to confront the 
complex question of what land degradation is. In its brief presented to Rio+20 calling for 
LDNW, the UNCCD Secretariat defined land degradation as the “reduction or loss of the 
biological or economic productivity and complexity of rainfed cropland, irrigated cropland, 
or range, pasture, forest and woodlands resulting from land uses or from a process or 
combination of processes, including processes arising from human activities and habitation 
patterns, such as: (i) soil erosion caused by wind and/or water; (ii) deterioration of the 
physical, chemical and biological or economic properties of soil; and (iii) long-term loss of 
natural vegetation.”17  This tracks the definition of desertification used within the UNCCD.18  
The complexity of this definition illustrates the challenges involved in defining a concept as 
broad as “land degradation.”19    
 At a biological level, land degradation manifests as “persistent reduction in biological 
productivity.”20  Depending on the land in question, reduced biological productivity might 
produce different consequences: in cropland, it might reduce soil fertility and yield per acre 
over time; in rangeland, it may reduce the land’s carrying capacity for cattle; in forests, it 
could reduce the provision of ecosystem services like water filtration and retention.21 Each 
                                                        
17
 ZNLD BRIEF, supra note 3, at 6.  
18
 In fact, this definition is taken essentially verbatim from the UNCCD, which defines “desertification” in this 
same manner but limits it to “arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas.”  UNCCD, supra note 1Art. 1(a),(g).  
19
 It is worth noting that although the quoted definition is the most legally entrenched and is widely accepted, 
it is not used universally.  See Michael M. Verstraete, Robert J. Scholes & Mark Stafford Smith, Climate and 
Desertification: Looking at an Old Problem through New Lenses, FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & THE ENVIRONMENT, Vol. 7, 
No. 8 (Oct. 2009), at 421 (explaining that the UNCCD’s definition is widely accepted). Alternative definitions 
track this one, but often in simpler terms.  See, e.g., Technical Support Team of the UNCCD, Issues Brief: 
Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought, supra note 4, at 1 (defining land degradation as “any 
diminishment of biodiversity and ecosystem functioning that negatively impacts the provisioning of ecosystem 
services and ultimately impedes poverty eradication and sustainable development”); see also Andersson et al., 
supra note 14, at 308 (“Land degradation is long-term loss of ecosystem function and service, caused by 
disturbances from which the system cannot recover unaided.”).   
20
 ZNLD BRIEF, supra note 3, at 11 (emphasis in original).  
21
 See Elizabeth Corell, THE NEGOTIATED DESERT: EXPERT KNOWLEDGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS OF THE CONVENTION TO COMBAT 
DESERTIFICATION 46 (Linköping Univ. Dept. of Water & Envtl. Studies Dissertation, 1999).  Of course, ecosystem 
service provision occurs across these land types.  See J.B. Ruhl, Agriculture and Ecosystem Services: Strategies 
for State and Local Governments, 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 424, 426 -427 (2008) (observing that “[i]n recent years . . 
. ecologists and economists focusing on agriculture have forged a more complete vision of the capacity of 
agricultural lands. They see farms as housing the natural capital capable of providing a stream of diverse good 
and services, including ecosystem services such as increased biodiversity, carbon sequestration, pollination, 
 6 
of these biological consequences also carries economic consequences, though some are 
more readily commoditized than others (e.g., changes in yield per acre can easily be 
measured in dollar terms, whereas declining ecosystem services often cannot be).22 The 
breadth of the UNCCD’s definition of land degradation thus captures the many diverse 
manifestations of the problem, but it also creates potential tension.  Are we worried about 
the ecological function or economic productivity of land?  The likely answer is both.  But 
how are we to strike a balance between the two?  One can imagine that solutions and 
interventions might look quite different depending on how one treats the value of non-
commoditized ecosystem services as compared to more readily measurable services like 
agricultural output.23  We will return to this tension in Part 4 below, where we explore in 
more detail the challenges of defining and measuring land degradation neutrality.   
 The emphasis on the word “persistent” in the definition above highlights another 
challenge in defining land degradation.  The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment suggests 
that degradation occurs when land does not return to its expected level of productivity 
after a stress is removed.24  For example, if land suffers from drought for several years and 
consequently loses productivity, but recovers after rains return, the phenomenon is not one 
of land degradation.25  But it is not always easy to determine when exactly a stress like 
drought has been “removed,” so as to define the line between a drought-induced state of 
deterioration and the type of persistent loss in productivity that constitutes actual “land 
degradation.”26  One prominent example of this challenge was seen in the vigorous debate 
about whether the African Sahel, which suffered catastrophic dry conditions throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century, was simply enduring a prolonged drought, or whether 
localized land management practices were contributing to the persistence of overly dry 
                                                                                                                                                                            
groundwater recharge, and improvement of water quality.”); Chasek et al., supra note 5, at 1 (explaining the 
persistent reduction of biodiversity as a defining feature of land degradation).  
22
 Cf. generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 157 (2007). 
23
 Cf. Rattan Lal et al., Zero Net Land Degradation: A New Sustainable Development Goal for Rio+20, Report 
prepared for the Secretariat of the UNCCD, at 4 (May 2012) (describing land degradation as concerning both 
land productivity and provision of other ecosystem services, without probing the tension between the two). 
24
 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 4, at 4.   
25
 See Alan Grainger et al., Desertification and Climate Change: The Case for Greater Convergence, MITIGATION 
AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 5: 361-377, at 363  (2000) (explaining that the identification of 
long-term land degradation trends is “made difficult by short-term fluctuations”). 
26
 See id.; see also Seely, M. et al., Advances in desertification and climate change research: Are they accessible 
for application to enhance adaptive capacity?, 64 GLOBAL & PLANETARY CHANGE 236, 237. 
 7 
conditions. 27   Many blamed the conditions on unsustainable farming and grazing 
practices.28 More recent research has shown that it was in fact the oceans that contributed 
to most of the Sahel’s long-term climate variability—i.e. the decades of drought—and to the 
resultant desert-like conditions, as opposed to on-the-ground mismanagement.29 Such 
experiences suggest that it is not necessarily accurate to classify even longer-term changes 
in land productivity as “degradation.”  Knowing where to draw this line is perplexing but 
important, as solutions that focus on responding to socio-economic causes of land 
degradation are only likely to be effective when such localized actions contribute 
meaningfully to an area’s decline in biological productivity.   
 
ii. Extent of the Problem 
This challenge of identifying “persistent” degradation is compounded by the 
technological and practical challenge of measuring all the land of the planet to determine its 
relative health.  Land degradation is typically measured by assessing land cover data 
captured via satellite, but land cover is criticized as a weak proxy for degradation.30  
Accuracy can be improved by pairing satellite imaging with local measurements and 
observations, but at greater expense of time and money.31  And even if accuracy can be 
                                                        
27
 See Alessandra Giannini, Michela Biasutti & Michel M. Verstraete, A climate model-based review of drought 
in the Sahel: Desertification, the re-greening and climate change, 64 GLOBAL & PLANETARY CHANGE 119, 119 
(2008). 
28
 See Andersson et al., supra note 14, at 299. 
29
 See Giannini, Biasutti & Verstraete, supra note 27, at 120; S.M. Herrmann & C.F. Hutchinson, The changing 
contexts of the desertification debate, 63 J. OF ARID ENVIRONMENTS 538, 542 (2005). More specifically, recent 
modeling suggests that sea surface temperatures are a major contributor to rainfall levels in the Sahel, and 
that the area’s “progression from the wetter-than-average 1950's and 1960's to the drier-than-average 1970's 
and 1980's . . . is related to a generalized pattern of warming of the global tropical oceans, especially of the 
Indian Ocean, combined with enhanced warming of the southern compared to the northern tropical Atlantic 
Ocean.” Id. at 120-21. Still, the literature supports some contribution, if minor, of local land-use changes to 
forcing the drought, either directly through changes in the local surface energy and water fluxes, see S.M. 
Hagos et al, Assessment of uncertainties in the response of the African monsoon precipitation to land use 
change simulated by a regional model, CLIMATE DYNAMICS (2014), doi:10.1007/s00382-014-2092-x, or via 
changes in the uplift of dust, see P. Ginoux et al., Global-scale attribution of anthropogenic and natural dust 
sources and their emission rates based on MODIS Deep Blue aerosol products, 50(3) REVIEWS OF GEOPHYSICS 
(2012) RG3005, doi:10.1029/2012RG000388; M. Yoshioka et al., Impact of Desert Dust Radiative Forcing on 
Sahel Precipitation: Relative Importance of Dust Compared to Sea Surface Temperature Variations, Vegetation 
Changes, and Greenhouse Gas Warming, 20(8) J. OF CLIMATE 1445–67 (2007), doi:10.1175/JCLI4056.1. 
30
 Ephraim Nkonya et al., Global extent of land degradation and its human dimension, in PRINCIPLES OF 
SUSTAINABLE SOIL MANAGEMENT IN AGROECOSYSTEMS 205 (eds. Rattan Lal & B.A. Stewart, Boca Raton, FL, US: CRC 
Press 2013). 
31
 Z.G. Bai et al., Proxy global assessment of land degradation, 24 SOIL USE & MGMT. 223, 224 (2008) (noting that 
satellite-assessed normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) is only a proxy that cannot “tell us anything 
 8 
achieved in measurements at a certain time, as the above discussion suggests, the “greatest 
challenge in mapping land degradation” may be “determining what the ‘non-degraded’ 
vegetation production or reference condition for any parcel of land or pixel should be.”32  As 
a result of these challenges, considerable debate persists about just how great the problem 
of land degradation is.33  There is general agreement that the problem is severe and will 
only get more pressing as population growth and changing consumption patterns continue 
to put pressure on existing lands and fuel expansion into marginal lands in order to meet 
future food, energy, water, and material needs.34  But when it comes to measuring the 
current extent of the problem, estimates of the percentage of land degraded worldwide 
range from as little as 15 percent to as much as 65 percent.35 The fact that estimates vary so 
widely is undoubtedly problematic for establishing an LDNW goal that relies on measuring 
the problem and tracking its improvement—a problem we return to in Part 4.   
 
iii. Causes 
Further complexity exists in considering the causes of land degradation.  There has 
long been a debate over the relative strength of anthropogenic versus natural causes of 
degradation, but all seem to agree that land degradation is caused by a combination of 
climatic variability—including extreme weather events and slower climatic changes that 
cause the preponderance of droughts or floods36—and human actions.37  Within this latter 
                                                                                                                                                                            
about the kind of degradation or improvement,” which requires “subsequent assessment of the actual field 
situation”). 
32
 K.J. Wessels et al., Mapping land degradation by comparison of vegetation production to spatially derived 
estimates of potential production, 72 J. OF ARID ENVIRONMENTS 1940, 1941 (2008). 
33
 Pandi Zdruli et al., What We Know About the Saga of Land Degradation and How to Deal With It?, at 5, in  
LAND DEGRADATION & DESERTIFICATION: ASSESSMENT, MITIGATION & REMEDIATION (P. Zdruli, ed., Springer Science 2010).  
34
 ZNLD Brief, supra note 3, at 9 (noting that by 2030, the demand for food is predicted to rise 50%, for energy 
45%, and for water 30%, requiring 175 million to 220 million hectares of additional cropland); MILLENNIUM 
ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 1 (“The pressure is increasing on dryland ecosystems for providing 
services such as food, forage, fuel, building materials, and water for humans and livestock, for irrigation, and 
for sanitation.”). But see Andersson et al., supra note 14, at 299 (discussing several studies that challenge “the 
neo-Malthusian proposition of population density as a main driver of land degradation”); Bai et al., supra note 
31, at 232 (“Comparison of rural population density with land degradation shows no simple pattern.”). 
35
 Technical Support Team of the UNCCD, Issues Brief: Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought, supra 
note 4, at 8. One assessment that further breaks down these estimates by ecosystem type finds that 20 
percent of cultivated areas, 30 percent of natural forests, and 25 percent of grasslands are already degraded 
or in the process of being degraded.  See Bai, ZG et al., Global assessment of land degradation and 
improvement, Identification by remote sensing, Report 2008/01, ISRIC—World Soil Information.  Estimates 
focusing specifically on drylands generally place the percentage already degraded between 10 and 20 percent.  
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 4, at 1.  
36
 See, e.g., Alexis Saba et al., Getting Ahead of the Curve: Supporting Adaptation to Long-term Climate Change 
and Short-term Climate Variability Alike, 1:2013 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 3, 4 (explaining that climate variability 
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category, researchers place socio-economic factors, land use patterns, over-exploitation of 
land by pastoral and agricultural uses, removal of vegetation, and poor water management, 
among other contributing factors (including major forces like urbanization, industrialization, 
and globalization).38  As researchers have gained a more sophisticated understanding of 
land degradation, they have developed more nuanced, layered explanations of causality: 
there are ecological components, direct land management components, and social, 
political, and economic factors that influence and inform land management decisions in 
important ways.39  This complexity means that agriculture or pastoralism can “play either a 
positive or negative role, depending on how it is managed.”40  Causes are also highly 
localized and vary both within and among ecosystem types and among communities.41 
Moreover, often the difference between cause and prevention may only be a matter of 
degree; for example, controlled fires may help manage land degradation, whereas frequent 
and intensive fires may be a cause.42   
Then there is the confounding factor of climate change.  Land degradation certainly 
contributes to climate change, as degraded land has less ability to sequester carbon.43  Land 
use changes and land degradation make up a significant portion—by some estimates as 
much as 20 percent—of worldwide greenhouse gas emissions, with forest clearing and 
forest degradation creating most of these emissions and drylands contributing about four 
percent.44  The converse is also true: although the pathways and linkages are not perfectly 
                                                                                                                                                                            
typically references “internal climate variability” that occurs as a result of natural internal processes within 
climate, as opposed to climate change, which accounts for “anthropogenic climate change in the industrial era 
and in the future).  The issue of how climate change factors into the causes of land degradation is discussed 
infra. 
37
 See S. Herrmann & C. Hutchinson, The Changing Contexts of the Desertification Debate, 63 J. OF ARID ENVTS. 
538, 539 (2005) (noting that there has been a long debate over the anthropogenic versus natural causes of 
desertification); Verstraete, Scholes & Smith, supra note 19, at 421 (noting disagreement over “root causes, 
characteristics, and consequences”); see also Zdruli et al., supra note 33, at 7; Lal et al., supra note 23, at 9; 
Elina Andersson et al., The Political Ecology of Land Degradation, 36 ANNUAL REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES 295, 296 
(2011) (“The political-ecology approach emphasizes that land degradation results from the interaction 
between the physical environment and society.”). 
38
 ZNLD BRIEF, supra note 3, at 8; M. Seely et al., supra note 26, at 237.   
39
 See, e.g., Andersson et al, supra note 14, at 297-98, 301. 
40
 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 35, at 9; see also Andersson et al., supra note 14, at 302. 
41
 Andersson et al., supra note 14, at 302. 
42
 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 4, at 10. 
43
 Grainger et al., supra note 25, at 363; UNEP, UNCCD, and UNDD, CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE AFRICAN DRYLANDS: 
OPTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADAPTATION AND MITIGATION, at 38 (2009) [hereinafter “CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICAN 
DRYLANDS”].   
44
  CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICAN DRYLANDS, supra note 43, at 38.  But see Grainger et al., supra note 25 (noting that 
estimates of carbon emissions from drylands’ degradation are inaccurate and need more work). Estimates for 
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understood, climate change is also a  force that contributes to land degradation.  Climate 
change is predicted to bring about (and in fact, is already causing) changing rainfall patterns 
and more extreme weather events,45 contributing to drought, flooding, erosion, and runoff; 
as well as increased temperatures, which cause additional soil moisture loss. 46  
Anthropogenic climate change is also responsible for some of the large-scale changes in 
atmospheric circulation that influence the amount of rain received in many regions, 
including sub-Saharan Africa47 and southeast South America,48 although it is difficult to 
confidently quantify climate change’s role in this complex system.49 Future climate effects 
vary widely by region and are not yet well understood.50  But it is increasingly apparent that 
climate change and land degradation are likely to create a detrimental positive feedback 
                                                                                                                                                                            
land degradation’s contribution to overall greenhouse gas emissions vary by methodology and source. Most 
recently, the IPCC estimated that agriculture, forestry, and other land-use contributed a combined 24% of 
2010 emissions. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, MITIGATION, 
TECHNICAL SUMMARY, at 12 (2014).  
45
 IPCC, MANAGING THE RISKS OF EXTREME EVENTS AND DISASTERS TO ADVANCE CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION. A SPECIAL 
REPORT OF WORKING GROUPS I AND II (Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). 
46
 CLIMATE CHANGE IN AFRICAN DRYLANDS, supra note 43, at 18; Lal et al., supra note 30 (ZNLD), at 13; Verstraete, 
Sholes & Smith, supra note 19, at 421; SAHARA AND SAHEL OBSERVATORY, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION AND & THE FIGHT 
AGAINST DESERTIFICATION 9-10 (2007) (explaining that climate change reduces rainfall and increases variability, 
thereby increasing the risks of desertification); David S. Battisti & Rosamond L. Naylor, Historical Warnings of 
Future Flood Insecurity with Unprecedented Seasonal Heat, 323 SCIENCE 240, 240-42 (Jan. 2009) (predicting that 
growing season temperatures by end of this century in tropics and subtropics will exceed the most extreme 
measurements from the 20
th
 century, causing crops to suffer); Smith et al., Agriculture, Forestry and Other 
Land Use (AFOLU), Working Group III – Mitigation of Climate Change of the IPCC, 45 (2014) (discussing the 
increase of dieback in the Amazon region due to increased drought in the region). 
47
 M. Biasutti & A. Giannini, Robust Sahel drying in response to late 20th century forcings, 33(11) GEOPHYSICAL 
RESEARCH LETTERS (2006), doi:10.1029/2006GL026067. 
48
 P.L. Gonzalez et al., Stratospheric ozone depletion: a key driver of recent precipitation trends in South 
Eastern South America, 42(7-8) CLIMATE DYNAMICS 1775–1792 (2013), doi:10.1007/s00382-013-1777-x.  
49
 Herrmann & Hutchinson, supra note 37, at 541-42; R. Zhang et al., Have Aerosols Caused the Observed 
Atlantic Multidecadal Variability?, JOURNAL OF THE ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCES, 130104154622004 (2013), 
doi:10.1175/JAS-D-12-0331.1; N.L. Bindoff et al., Detection and Attribution of Climate Change: from Global to 
Regional, in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge Univ. Press, eds. T.F. 
Stocker et al. 2013); W. Cramer et al., Detection and Attribution of Observed Impacts, in Climate Change 2014: 
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014). 
50
 For example, outlier climate models buck the majority view on whether rainfall will increase or decrease 
across the Sahel, see Giannini, Biasutti & Verstraete, supra note 27, at 125; Michela Biasutti, Forced Sahel 
rainfall trends in the CMIP5 archive, JOURNAL OF GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH 118(4), 1613–1623 (2013), 
doi:10.1002/jgrd.50206, and some scientists even question the consensus model projections for the Horn of 
Africa.  See W. Yang et al., The East African Long Rains in Observations and Models, J. CLIMATE (2014), 
140403142037009, doi:10.1175/JCLI-D-13-00447.1.. 
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loop, as climate change contributes to land degradation, which releases further carbon, 
which in turn contributes to further land degradation.51   
 
iv. Prevention and Cure 
While the extent of land degradation remains debated and its causes confounding 
and complex, there does seem to be more scientific convergence on methods to prevent 
land degradation and restore degraded land.  In general, most researchers point to 
“sustainable land management” (SLM) as the predominant strategy for both preventing and 
reversing degradation.52  SLM is a “knowledge-based combination of technologies, policies 
and practices that integrate land, water, biodiversity, and environmental concerns . . . to 
meet rising food and fibre demands while sustaining ecosystem services and livelihoods.”53 
Practically speaking, this might include improving the supply of soil water, enhancing soil 
quality, decreasing water losses to runoff and evaporation, protecting vegetative cover, 
integrating pastoral and cropping uses of land, and water harvesting and recycling.54  Local 
and traditional practices often have much to offer in determining appropriate natural 
resource management strategies.55  These more ecological interventions, however, are 
often thought not to be enough to independently sustain improvements in land quality—
many suggest that they must be accompanied by major socio-economic changes, including 
improving government effectiveness, rural services, and land tenure and rights; addressing 
gender disparities; and improving access to markets and credits.56 Finally, payments for 
ecosystem services are often mentioned as a potential tool to encourage adoption of 
specific SLM practices.57 
                                                        
51
 See Herrmann & Hutchinson, supra note 37, at 542 (“Not only can global warming contribute to 
desertification, but desertification can also contribute to global warming by playing a role in altering sources 
and sinks of greenhouse gases.”). 
52
 See Lal et al., supra note 23, at 17; Nyonka et al., supra note 19, at 221; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 
supra note 4, at 14-15. 
53
 Lal et al, supra note 23, at 17. see also Chasek et al., supra note 5, at 1  
54
 Lal et al, supra note 23, at 17; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 4, at 14-15.  
55
 Technical Support Team of the UNCCD, supra note 4, at 5.  
56
 Lal et al., supra note 23, at 18; Nyonka et al., supra note 19, at 221; see also Andersson et al., supra note 14, 
at 303 (“[A] narrow focus on technical solutions runs the risk of leading to policy failure.”). 
57
 See, e.g.., Lal et al., supra note 23, at 19 (imagining that payments might be made by “individuals, 
communities, local government, national governments or even international institutions”); Andersson et al., 
supra note 14, at 306, 307 (noting the rise of the concept, but also scholars’ concerns that payments for 
ecosystem services “may further increase the marginalization of indigenous people through an overly narrow 
focus on a few monetarized aspects of the ecosystem). 
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There appears to be greater consensus about the ability of these strategies to 
prevent land degradation than to restore already degraded land.58  Overall, successful 
stories of restoration appear limited, causing the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment to 
conclude that restoration “may be difficult even with major policy and technological 
interventions.”59 And, especially if greenhouse gas emissions continue to balloon, climate 
change may become an increasingly disruptive force that thwarts many efforts to prevent 
and restore degraded land.  As such, addressing greenhouse gas emissions will be an 
important component of achieving land degradation neutrality (in addition to LDNW serving 
as an important component of addressing greenhouse gas emissions).  Similarly, 
coordinating LDNW and adaptation strategies will be essential to ensure that lands are 
protected or restored for conditions expected in the future, rather than observed in the 
past.  
 
b. From the Desertification Convention to “LDNW” 
 The LDNW push has come largely from the desertification policy community.60  
Historically, desertification has been treated as a discrete problem and governed by a series 
of international conventions aimed specifically at halting and reversing its spread. As 
explained below, however, the recent call for expanding the global focus from 
                                                        
58
 Compare Lal et al., supra note 23, at 15 (asserting that we know how to manage land sustainably to prevent 
degradation, and soil can be rehabilitated and productivity restored) with Pamela Chasek et al., Zero Net Land 
Degradation: Outcome of “Operationalizing the Zero Net Land Degradation Target” Session at the Sede Boqer 
Fourth Int’l Conf. on Drylands, Deserts, and Desertification, at 4-5 (8 Jan. 2013) (endorsing sustainable land 
management as a tool for using land without degrading it, while noting that the world has less experience with 
restoration tools). On payments for ecosystem services more generally, see 
e.g., KATOOMBA GROUP, PAYMENTS FOR ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, GETTING STARTED: A PRIMER (May 2008), available at  
http://www.unep.org/pdf/PaymentsForEcosystemServices_en.pdf; Keith H. Hirokawa & Elizabeth J. Porter, 
Aligning Regulation with the Informational Need: Ecosystem Services and the Next Generation of 
Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV. 963 (2013); J.B. RUHL, STEVEN E. KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER L. LANT, THE LAW AND 
POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM SERVICES (Island Press 2007); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, The Law and Policy Beginnings of 
Ecosystem Services, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 157 (2007). 
59
 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, supra note 4, at 16; see also R.K.A. Morris et al., The creation of 
compensatory habitat—Can it secure sustainable development?, J. FOR NATURE CONSERVATION 14:106 (2006) 
(asserting that habitat creation is much more easily accomplished in wetlands and inter-tidal environments 
than it is in terrestrial ecosystems); Martine Maron et al., Faustian bargains? Restoration realities in the 
context of biodiversity offset policies, 155 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 141, 144 (2012) (finding that restoration 
projects do not have a high success rate, and that restoration is particularly challenging where “external 
degrading influences” exist, such as urbanization and agricultural intensification).   
60
 See Chasek et al., supra note 58, at 3. 
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desertification to land degradation stems from an almost universal agreement that 
desertification governance has been a failure to date.61 
 The primary international agreement concerning desertification is the 1994 UNCCD. 
This convention replaced a looser, non-binding “Plan of Action to Combat Desertification” 
agreed upon at the 1977 United Nations Conference on Desertification.62  The UNCCD was 
ratified by 195 countries.63  Under the UNCCD, affected countries64 are encouraged to 
submit “National Action Programmes” (NAPs), which report on the extent of the problem 
within the country and outline the national policy and institutional initiatives planned to 
combat desertification. 65  These NAPs can then be used to solicit funding from developed 
country sources, although the funding picture is complicated by the fact that the UNCCD 
does not have its own financing tool.  Instead, the UNCCD includes a “Global Mechanism” 
related to funding, but its mandate extends only to increasing the effectiveness and 
efficiency of existing financial mechanisms.66 For this reason, although developed countries 
pledged in the Convention to “actively support” and “provide substantial financial 
resources” to affected developing countries,67 financing of the actions proposed in NAPs 
“depends mainly on the good intentions of bilateral cooperation projects.”68  The little 
                                                        
61
 Alan Grainger, The Role of Science in Implementing International Environmental Agreements: The Case of 
Desertification, 20 LAND DEGRAD. & DEVELOP. 410, 411 (2009); see also UNCCD Decision 3/COP.8: The 10-year 
strategic plan and framework to enhance the implementation of the Convention, at 8 (2007) (hereinafter 
“Strategic Plan”); Jeff Tollefson & Natasha Gilbert, Earth Summit: Rio report card, NATURE, VOL. 486, 6 JUNE 
2012, at 23 (giving the UNCCD an overall grade of an “F”). 
62
  See Report of the United Nations Conference on Desertification, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.74/36 (1977); Corell, 
supra note 21, at 19. 
63
 The UNCCD now has 194 ratifications, as Canada withdrew as of March 28, 2014 (largely for domestic, 
symbolic political reasons).  See Update on Ratification of the UNCCD, Secretariat to the UNCCD, 
http://www.unccd.int/Lists/SiteDocumentLibrary/convention/ratification-eng.pdf (last visited April 15, 2014); 
Mike Blanchfield, Canada first country to pull out of UN drought convention, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL March 27, 
2013 (quoting a spokesman of Canada’s International Cooperation Minister explaining the withdrawal on the 
grounds that “membership in this convention was costly for Canadians and showed few results, if any for the 
environment,” while noting that Canada provided $283,000 to support the convention from 2010 to 2012). 
64
 “‘Affected countries,’ means countries whose lands include, in whole or in part, ‘affected areas,’”, which are 
separately defined as “arid, semi-arid and/or dry sub-humid areas affected or threatened by desertification.’” 
UNCCD, supra note 1, Art. 1, (h)-(i). 
65
 See id. Art. 9.1, 10; Grainger, supra note 61, at 419-20.  Developing countries are particularly encouraged to 
submit NAPs, although other “affected countries” can submit a NAP if they so desire.  See Art. 9.1; see also 
Chasek et al., supra note 5, at 1 (discussing the role of the UNCCD and NAPs). 
66
 See UNCCD, supra note 1, Art. 21.   
67
 Id. Art. 6(a)-(b). 
68
 YOUBA SOKONA, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION & THE FIGHT AGAINST DESERTIFICATION, REPORT OF THE SAHARA AND SAHEL 
OBSERVATORY, at 20-21 (2007); Grainger, supra note 61, at 419 (observing that NAPs reflect limited institutional 
capacity and receive considerably less funding that country-level biodiversity or climate change reports). 
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multilateral international financing available is channeled through the Global Environmental 
Facility’s land degradation project.69  Between 2003 and 2012, the GEF approved 96 
projects under its “land degradation focal point,” providing $346 million in funding 
supplemented by $1.85 billion in co-financing (including bilateral aid).70 This spending 
amounted to about four percent of GEF funding between the years 1991 and 2011—
certainly a disappointing result for those who believe that healthy land is key to advancing a 
large variety of development and environmental goals.71   
The UNCCD is a “sister convention” to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and United Nations Convention on Biodiversity (UNCBD), as they 
all emerged out of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit.72  However, the UNCCD may more accurately 
be analogized to a forgotten stepsister, given the comparatively paltry amounts of 
international attention and funding it has received. During the same period that land 
degradation received four percent of GEF funds, climate change received 31% and 
biodiversity 37%.73 Several challenges are frequently identified as major contributors to the 
UNCCD’s lack of success: lack of clarity around the concept and measurement of 
“desertification,”74 lack of high quality scientific input and an ineffective science-policy 
                                                        
69
 See Chasek, supra note 14, at 86-87.  During negotiations, developing countries pushed for a separate 
Desertification Fund within the Convention, but were unsuccessful. The financing issue was “an almost 
insurmountable obstacle in the final stages of the negotiations in 1994.”
 
  Bo Kjellén, The Role of the 
Desertification Convention in the Early 21
st
 Century, ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 40/2: 146, 152 (2010). The GEF now serves 
as the financial mechanism for the UNCCD, but has not proved the “panacea” to the financing problem that 
many developing countries hoped it would be. Chasek, supra note 14, at 84. 
70
 Chasek, supra note 14, at 84-85. 
71
 Id. Chasek notes, however, that some additional funding reached land degradation projects under “multi-
focal” grants, although this funding is harder to trace. 
72
 See Andersson et al., supra note 14, at 305 (noting that the three conventions are therefore often 
collectively referred to as the “Rio Conventions.”). 
73
 See, e.g. Chasek, supra note 14, at 85 (noting that climate change received 31% of GEF funds from 1991-
2011, biodiversity 37%, and land 4%).  
74
 There has been no evolution in the official definition used by the UNCCD since adoption of the Convention—
recent documents still define desertification as “land degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas 
resulting from various factors, including climatic variations and human activities.”  See, e.g., ZNLD BRIEF, supra 
note 3, at 8.  This definition was, apparently, the product of a hard-fought compromise during early 
negotiations. See Bo Kjellén, The Role of the Desertification Convention in the Early 21
st
 Century, ENVTL. POL’Y & 
L. 40/2: 146 (2010) (noting that one of Agenda 21’s achievements was to agree on the “very difficult question” 
of how to define desertification). But in practice, desertification means different things to different countries 
and different scientific communities. Steffen Bauer & Lindsay C. Stringer, The Role of Science in the Global 
Governance of Desertification, J. OF ENVT. & DEVELOPMENT 18: 248, 257 (July 2009); Grainger, supra note 61, at 
419.  
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interface,75 and lack of funding.76  The end result is that desertification has continued to 
worsen despite the nominally “urgent concern of the international community.”77   
The widespread frustration around the lack of progress on desertification is one of 
the driving forces behind the new turn away from a narrow focus on desertification, to a 
broader focus on land degradation.78  Desertification has long been defined as “a subset of 
land degradation under dry climates,” 79 making the leap a direct and logical one.  And even 
under the reframing, as UNCCD Secretariat publications are careful to point out, 
desertification remains a key concern as a result of its scale: drylands are home to 38% of 
the world’s population—over 2 billion people—and cover 41 percent of the earth’s land 
surface.80   
Nevertheless, the refocusing represents a marked change of strategy.  For a long 
time, the UNCCD was held up by developing countries as “our convention”—a hard-fought 
international agreement focused specifically on a predominantly developing world problem 
(and one that is particularly pernicious in Africa)—in contrast to the developed-country 
concerns of climate change and biodiversity.81  Thus, a definitional broadening, to the more 
global issue of “land degradation,” is not supported by all within the desertification policy 
community.82  Those in favor of such universalizing defend their position on the grounds 
that it will attract more international attention, more funding, and more concrete action.83  
                                                        
75
 Grainger, supra note 61; Luc Gnacadja and Lindsay S. Stringer, Towards a Global Authority on Desertification 
and Land Degradation, ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 42/2: 87 (2012). 
76
 See Chasek et al., supra note 5, at 1.  See also Strategic Plan, supra note 61 (acknowledging some of the 
CCD’s chief flaws: “insufficient financing compared to its two Rio sister conventions, a weak scientific basis, 
insufficient advocacy and awareness among various constituencies, institutional weaknesses and difficulties in 
reaching consensus among Parties.”). 
77
 See UNCCD, supra note 1, Preamble. Of course, the UNFCCC and UNCBD are not generally thought of as 
success stories, either, but they have attracted relatively greater financing and attention. 
78
 See Chasek et al., supra note 58, at 3 (noting that it is relatively recently that desertification became framed 
as a “subset” of land degradation). 
79
 ZNLD BRIEF, supra note 3, at 8. 
80
 See United Nations Envt. Program, Dryland Systems, in ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT STATE AND 
TRENDS, at 625 (2005), available at http://www.unep.org/maweb/documents/document.291.aspx.pdf; see also 
Lal et al., supra note 23, at 9.   
81
 Some critics have suggested that part of the UNCCD’s implementation trouble stems from the fact that 
“developed countries have been reluctant to acknowledge desertification as a global commons problem,” and 
that this reluctance drives their refusal to commit to substantive legal and financial obligations. Bauer & 
Stringer, supra note 74, at 251. 
82
 See Earth Negotiations Bulletin, UNCCD COP 11 Highlights, Friday, 20 September 2013, Vol. 4, No. 248; 
UNCCD COP 11 Highlights, Thursday, 26 September 2013, Vol. 4, No. 252, at 2. 
83
 See, e.g., A STRONGER UNCCD, supra note 7, at 12, 14 (arguing that land is the “vital natural capital resource” 
that unites many of the world’s goals around food, energy, and water, and that a target-setting approach will 
catalyze funding). 
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In part, this perception stems from an understanding that climate change is likely to be a 
dominant funding priority in the coming decades.84  LDNW, as opposed to a focus on 
desertification, encompasses lands that are more carbon-rich than deserts.85 This breadth 
of land types potentially makes a more compelling case for why the world should devote 
more of its limited resources to land degradation prevention.86  But at the same time, many 
experts caution against fully integrating desertification into the climate change regime, 
suggesting that it would be risky to reduce land degradation to solely a matter of carbon 
sequestration, given that land degradation is more widely tied to the livelihoods of billions 
of people and a range of environmental concerns.87 
Whether or not broadening the world’s focus from desertification to land 
degradation will revitalize attention and funding in the manner hoped for will depend 
largely on how the framing and implementation of this broader agenda proceeds.  To be 
successful, we argue, careful work needs to be done to craft LDNW into an organizing 
framework with scientific and legal accountability.  The following subsection explores the 
work done on LDNW to date, after which we will examine what LDNW might learn from 
analogous land governance regimes. 
 
c. The LDNW Framework, to Date 
Policy-makers and advocates have already taken a few steps towards creating an 
LDNW framework.  Parties to the UNCCD devoted particular attention to new avenues for 
progress on desertification in advance of Rio+20 in 2012.  Many saw Rio+20 “as an 
opportunity to catalyze recognition of desertification, land degradation and drought issues 
on the international sustainable development agenda, raising hopes that the UNCCD could 
                                                        
84
 See, e.g., Grainger, supra note 61, at 419.   
85
 Desertification is estimated to make up about four percent of annual global carbon emissions, due to 
drylands’ expansive global coverage, see MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 18, although their 
carbon sequestration potential is less than forests.  See Food & Agric. Org. of the UN, Soil Carbon 
Sequestration for Improved Land Management, at 5 (2001) (“[D]rylands represent about 40 percent of the 
world’s land, [such that] even if the carbon content . . . of drylands [is] low, they can make an important 
contribution to global carbon sequestration . . . .”). 
86
 See, e.g., Grainger, supra note 61, at 425 (suggesting that perhaps proponents of halting desertification 
could make more progress outside of the desertification regime, treating the issue instead as a special case of 
degradation of terrestrial carbon stocks). 
 
87
 See discussion accompanying notes 254-257, infra (I cannot cross-reference these in track changes, though, 
so the note numbers are likely to change). 
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help the global community recognize that land policy must be incorporated when 
addressing multiple environmental crises.”88  
In accord with this strategy, the UNCCD Secretariat approached Rio +20 with the 
request that delegates adopt a goal of Zero Net Land Degradation (“ZNLD”) by 2030.89 A 
policy brief prepared by the UNCCD Secretariat in May 2012 in advance of Rio +20 outlines 
its vision in this regard.90 Noting that population dynamics and increasing demand for 
energy, food, and water are expected to dramatically increase pressures on the land, the 
brief makes the case that land preservation is one of the most critical steps we can take to 
alleviate poverty, prevent conflict, and address climate change.91  It paints LDNW as an 
achievable, effective organizing framework, which would aspire to either avoid degradation 
or offset degradation by land restoration.92  And because the world will also require 
increasing amounts of food in the future, LDNW further requires “intensifying the yields 
from currently used lands without degrading these lands, and/or without expanding the 
agriculture frontier to lands that are not subject to agriculture and pastoralism.”93 
Although the Rio+20 conference received considerable criticism from the 
environmental and sustainable development communities for its lack of meaningful 
outcomes,94 notable progress was made on LDNW.  The Rio+20 “Outcome Document” 
includes an acknowledgement of “the need for urgent action to reverse land degradation” 
and a pledge to “strive to achieve a land-degradation neutral world in the context of 
sustainable development.”95   Of course, the “Outcome Document” is far from a treaty with 
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 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Summary of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the U.N. 
Convention to Combat Desertification: 10-21 Oct. 2011, at 17, available at 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb04241e.pdf. 
89
 The UNCCD Secretariat recommended several complementary steps as well in its brief to Rio+20, including 
agreement on a new legal instrument (perhaps a “ZNLD Protocol” under the CCD); establishment of an 
“Intergovernmental Panel/Platform on Land and Soil” as a scientific and technical authority; and a 
comprehensive assessment of the “Economics of Land Degradation.”  See ZNLD Brief, supra note 3.  
90
 Id. 
91
 Id. at 9. 
92
 Id. at 12; see also Lal et al., supra note 23, at 14.  
93
 Lal et al., supra note 23, at 15. 
94
 See, e.g. James Van Alstine et al, The UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20): A sign of the 
times or ‘ecology as spectacle’?, 22 ENVTL. POLITICS 333, 334 (2013) (noting that the outcome document is weak 
on commitments or agreed actions); Ann Powers, The Rio+20 Process: Forward Movement for the 
Environment?, 1 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 403, 404-05 (2012) (explaining that RIO+20 is not generally regarded as 
successful, as it lacked the broad goals and vision of the earlier Rio conference). 
95
 United Nations Rio +20 Conference on Sustainable Development, Outcome of the Conference, 
A/CONF.216/L.1, at 39 (June 19, 2012).  Summaries of the negotiations suggest, however, that delegates in 
splinter group discussions were not successful in having the “zero net rate” terminology included, and that 
there was also disagreement over referencing action by the international community. Earth Negotiations 
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binding effect; rather, one scholar describes it as a “statement of hopes, aspirations, 
admonitions, and promises.”96  Nevertheless, it remains “the kind of soft law document that 
can provide a basis for legal arguments on many fronts,”97 making the Outcome Document’s 
embrace of LDNW an important starting point for building a viable LDNW framework and 
program. 
There is now a sense in the desertification community that it is time to capitalize 
upon the momentum generated by the Rio+20 goal of LDNW, particularly in advance of the 
elaboration of the UN’s 2015 Sustainable Development Goals.98  Since adoption of the 
LDNW goal at Rio+20, a few expert events have focused on the topic.  During “Global Soil 
Week,” which took place in Berlin in November 2012, one day was devoted to exploring the 
concept of LDNW.99  In June 2013, the UNCCD convened a meeting of experts in Korea to 
discuss moving forward on LDNW.100  Experts at these meetings have called for several next 
steps.  The most common call is for movement from the general goal of LDNW to more 
specific targets, perhaps including the “Zero Net Land Degradation by 2030” target 
espoused by the UNCCD Secretariat. Some also suggest pilot projects in order to determine 
how to apply the LDNW goal in particular areas and how to measure and monitor 
success.101  Finally, there is strong—but not universal—support for including LDNW as one 
of the 2015 U.N. Sustainable Development Goals. 102  
However, the most recent UNCCD Conference of the Parties (COP11), which took 
place in Namibia in September 2013, highlighted the conceptual work that remains to be 
done on LDNW.  Most delegates agreed that clarification was needed to understand the 
role of the UNCCD in promoting LDNW and in moving from broad theory to 
implementation.  The United States went so far as to propose deleting any reference in 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Bulletin, Summary of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development: 13-22 June 2012, at 15, 
available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb2751e.pdf. 
96
 Powers, supra note 94, at 408. 
97
 Id. at 410. 
98
 See supra note 13 for an explanation of Sustainable Development Goals.  
99
 See Chasek et al., supra note 58. 
100
 See Chair’s Summary, Consultative Meeting on a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) on LDNW and on the 
associated target for ZNLD, 27-27 June 2013-Seoul, Korea. 
101
 See Presentation of Dr. Pamela Chasek, UNCCD LDNW Meeting June 2013 (presentations from this expert 
working group are available on the UNCCD’s website at 
http://www.unccd.int/en/programmes/RioConventions/RioPlus20/Pages/LDNW-Expert-Meeting.aspx). 
102
 The UNCCD Secretariat believes that an LDNW SDG “would provide a coherent framework for action to 
safeguard healthy and productive land and soil.” A STRONGER UNCCD, supra note 7, at 6.  However, some 
experts questioned whether a “stand-alone target on land [is] germane,” suggesting that “land and soil issues 
could be adequately addressed within the likely SDGs on poverty, water, energy and food security.”  UNCCD, 
Outcomes of the consultative meeting of experts on a land degradation neutral world, 22 July 2013, at 5. 
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UNCCD outcome documents to the concepts of LDNW and ZNLD due to “lack of clarity and 
scientific agreement.”103  Others proposed proceeding with caution in expanding the 
UNCCD’s mandate beyond drylands.104  One delegate called the UNCDD decision on how to 
follow up the Rio+20 LDNW outcome the “elephant in the room” at the COP.105 Ultimately, 
the COP decided to “launch an intersessional process to examine how to define the 
Convention’s goals on combating [desertification and drylands degradation] in relation to 
the Rio+20 outcome calling for effort to achieve a Land Degradation Neutral World 
(LDNW).”106  This confusion and disagreement over the concept of LDNW at COP11 was in 
accordance with the conclusion reached by experts at the July 2013 working group that 
“more clarity was needed . . . in defining LDNW and the role of the UNCCD.”107  The 
remainder of this article suggests issues and lessons to consider in clarifying the vision for 
LDNW.    
   
III. PAST EXAMPLES: WETLANDS MITIGATION BANKING AND REDD+ 
LDNW is not an entirely novel experiment proceeding within a void.  Instead, it 
represents the latest—and perhaps most ambitious—example of conceptualizing 
environmental goals in terms of “neutrality.” The following section explores two existing 
land-focused programs that have utilized “neutrality” frameworks to orient their design and 
administration.  Before proceeding to an overview of the two programs we have selected 
for comparison—the United States’ Wetlands Mitigation Banking (WMB) and the 
international scheme for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD+)—it bears explaining why we chose these particular examples. WMB—a U.S. 
program that aims to achieve “no net loss” in wetlands—presents a mature example of a 
biodiversity offsetting program.  This program bears close resemblance to LDNW in its focus 
on measuring and netting land functionality.  In contrast, REDD+ attempts to tackle what 
might be termed a “subset” of land degradation, focusing specifically on neutralizing global 
carbon emissions through improving forest carbon sinks. REDD+ stands as a particularly 
valuable example of the implementation challenges that a measurement-based, neutrality-
framed, land-oriented program faces in the developing world.  
                                                        
103
 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, UNCCD COP 11 Highlights, Friday, 20 September 2013, Vol. 4, No. 248. 
104
 See id. (Brazil, China).  
105
 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, UNCCD COP 11 Highlights, Thursday, 26 September 2013, Vol. 4, No. 252, at 2. 
106
 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, UNCCD COP 11 Highlights, Monday, 30 September 2013, Vol. 4, No. 254, at 2; 
ICCD/COP(11)/L.19. 
107
 See Chair’s Summary, Consultative Meeting on a Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) on LDNW and on the 
associated target for ZNLD, 27-27 June 2013-Seoul, Korea, at 3. 
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Much has been written about each of these examples.  Below, we focus on a broad 
overview of conceptual and practical challenges raised by these programs’ experiences 
designing and implementing a goal of “neutrality.”   
 
a. Wetlands Mitigation Banking: The First Biodiversity Offset Experiment  
Wetlands Mitigation Banking (WMB) represents an early experiment with a class of 
emerging “biodiversity offset” programs.  These programs, which are “proliferating” across 
the world,108 aim to strike a balance between development and biodiversity protection by 
requiring that losses in ecosystems caused by development be offset by a concomitant 
restoration of habitat elsewhere.109  Such programs are typically tied to government “no net 
loss” policies, which seek to stabilize rates of habitat loss.110  The United States, Australia, 
Brazil, Colombia, South Africa, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, among 
others, now operate their own versions of biodiversity offsetting.111   
The United States’ WMB Program is the most mature of these offset frameworks 
and the first formalized program to embody the concept of biodiversity offsetting, thus 
lending itself most easily to retrospective analysis.112  As it happens, the program also 
epitomizes many of the challenges that programs around the world have faced.113     
                                                        
108
 Bruce A. McKenney & Joseph M. Kiesecker, Policy Development for Biodiversity Offsets: A Review of Offset 
Frameworks, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 45:165-176 (2010), at 165; Walker et al., supra note 12, at 149. 
109
 See, e.g., Maron et al., supra note 59, at 141 (defining biodiversity offsetting as “compensating for the 
losses of biodiversity components at an impact site by generating (or attempting to generate) ecologically 
equivalent gains, or ‘credits,’ elsewhere (i.e. an offset site)”). 
110
 Id. at 142 (noting that these programs are increasingly tied to “no net loss” policies).   
111
 Bruce A. McKenney & Joseph M. Kiesecker, Policy Development for Biodiversity Offsets: A Review of Offset 
Frameworks, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 45:165-176, at 165 (2010). Brazil’s program follows a somewhat 
different framework than most others, in that it utilizes payments from developers to the government instead 
of requiring private efforts at offsets.  This payment model represents an interesting alternative that might 
prove promising, but it is still in its early stages of development.  Id. at 166.  A 2012 review found a total of 39 
active biodiversity offsetting programs and 25 more under development.  See Maron et al., supra note 59, at 
141. 
112
 McKenney & Kiesecker, supra note 111, at 166; Shelley Burgin, BioBanking: an environmental scientist’s 
view of the role of biodiversity banking offsets in conservation, BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION 17:807-816, 807 
(2008). 
113
 See, e.g., McKenney & Kiesecker, supra note 111, at 168-74 (identifying common issues in six biodiversity 
offsetting programs, and suggesting that there is considerable consensus among the programs); Philip Gibbons 
& David B. Lindenmayer, Offsets for land clearing: No net loss or the tail wagging the dog?, ECOLOGICAL MGMT. 
& RESTORATION VOL. 8, NO. 1 (April 2007) (noting that poor compliance track records in offsetting programs 
extend beyond Wetlands Mitigation Banking). 
 21 
WMB was created not through specific legislation or regulation, but rather sprang 
up more organically as way to fulfill certain requirements in the U.S. Clean Water Act.114  
That Act discourages development of wetlands by prohibiting such development in the 
absence of a permit.115 To receive a permit, an applicant must show that (1) no reasonable 
alternatives exist to development of wetlands; (2) the proposed development design 
minimizes the harm done to wetlands; and (3) mitigation efforts will be undertaken to 
restore other wetlands to compensate for unavoidable wetlands losses.116  As originally 
implemented, these parameters were interpreted to require “on-site” and “in-kind” 
compensatory mitigation, meaning that any offsetting required by a certain project had to 
occur on the same property, with the same kind of wetlands.117  The Army Corps of 
Engineers (“the Corps”), which administers the Clean Water Act’s permitting process,118 also 
interpreted the relevant regulations to create a mitigation “hierarchy” that first favored 
restoration,119 then enhancement,120 and preservation only as a last resort option.121 
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 WMB was first utilized as an experiment on the local level.  Early successes, theoretical advantages, and 
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115
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of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
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unavoidable losses.  See Womble & Doyle, supra note 115, at 246.  It is worth noting that the Clean Water Act 
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Privatization of Environmental Permitting, 46 AKRON L. REV. 1091, 1096-97 (2013). 
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 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 114, at 4. 
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 The Corps shares its permitting authority with the Environmental Protection Agency, which establishes 
standards for the Corps to apply when ruling on permits.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b).   
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 “Restoration means the manipulation of the physical, chemical, or biological characteristics of a site with 
the goal of returning natural/historic functions to a former or degraded aquatic resource.” 33 C.F.R. § 332.2.  
120
 “Enhancement means the manipulation of the physical, chemical, or biological characteristics of an aquatic 
resource to heighten, intensify, or improve a specific aquatic resource function(s).” 33 C.F.R. § 332.2.  
121
 See 33 C.F.R. § 332.3(a)(2) (explaining that “restoration should generally be the first option considered 
because the likelihood of success is greater and the impacts to potentially ecologically important uplands are 
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Although the on-site program proved popular as a means of freeing up some 
wetlands for development,122 the project-by-project approach “fail[ed] miserably, in terms 
of environmental protection.”123  The piecemeal approach made creating standardized and 
effective offset criteria and establishing long-term monitoring very difficult, which in turn 
led to many poorly conceived and executed projects.124  For these reasons, the Corps began 
experimenting in the 1990s with “banking” as an alternative to on-site mitigation.125  Under 
a banking system, project developers could purchase the wetlands offsets needed from 
dedicated wetlands bankers, rather than develop projects on-site themselves. 126 
Proponents reasoned that WMB would resolve many of the problems plaguing early efforts 
at offsets, because it would consolidate the locations and oversight of offset projects, 
create implementation expertise, allow restoration to occur ahead of wetlands 
development, and ease monitoring costs.127   
Although it has resulted in robust trading,128 in practice WMB has failed to resolve 
compensatory mitigation’s challenges.  Presidential administrations since George H.W. Bush 
have pledged to enforce the Clean Water Act in a way that ensures “no net loss” of 
wetlands,129 but the United States has continually fallen woefully short of this goal.130  The 
                                                                                                                                                                            
reduced compared to establishment, and the potential gains in terms of aquatic resource functions are 
greater, compared to enhancement and preservation”). The preference for restoration is often explained as an 
effort to achieve maximum “additionality” in offsetting (a concept discussed infra with respect to carbon 
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 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 114, at 5. 
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 Id. at 5.  See also Morgan M. Robertson, The neoliberalization of ecosystem services: wetland mitigation 
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130
 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 113; Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 127, at 652-53.  
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biggest challenge that WMB has encountered is that it is unable to solve the puzzle of 
“commodifying” something as complex as wetlands ecology into a tradable unit.131  Most 
WMB programs use acres as a proxy for measuring the value of wetlands, requiring a 
developer to offset acres of wetlands lost by an equal or greater amount of acres gained.132  
But one acre of wetlands may provide a very different level of actual ecosystem and habitat 
services than another acre,133 and there is a natural tendency for banks to acquire and 
restore the cheapest acres possible, without regard to habitat quality.134  Furthermore, 
although banking has consolidated the locations of restored wetlands, it has not added the 
incentives or monitoring capabilities necessary to ensure robust, long-term 
implementation.135  And finally, while banking unlocks efficiencies by allowing mitigation to 
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occur at locations other than on-site, it adds a geographical complication: not only might 
one banked acre not be of the same quality as the acre lost, but it also might be in a 
location where the services provided by the acre are not as valuable as they would have 
been at the original site.136  Consequently, studies have consistently found that although the 
United States has gained in acres of wetlands since the advent of WMB, it has lost when it 
comes to “functional value” or “service provision.”137  Indeed, some studies estimate that 
the actual amount of wetlands impacts that have been successfully offset are as low as 20%, 
which would indicate an 80% net loss in wetlands functions.138 Thus, in terms of the end 
goal—preserving environmental quality139—the United States’ policy of “no net loss” has 
failed, even though it may look like a success story on paper.  
 In response to these studies, the Corps implemented new WMB regulations in 2008 
that attempt to address some of the problems identified above.140  The new regulations 
maintain a preference for wetlands banking141 but take a “watershed approach,” requiring 
offset projects to occur within the same local watershed as the wetlands destruction but 
relaxing strict “in-kind” requirements.142  In theory, this approach should guarantee local 
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benefits while also providing some flexibility in choosing the most suitable offset 
locations.143  The regulations also call for offset sites to be “ecologically suitable for 
providing the desired aquatic resource functions,” suggesting that something more than 
acreage should be used to determine appropriate mitigation efforts.144 They do not, 
however, create any strict requirements in this regard.  Scholars have therefore concluded 
that, while the regulations have promise, much will depend upon their future application.145 
The design, central challenges, and disappointing results of WMB to date are 
characteristic of biodiversity offsetting programs operating across the world.146  Legal and 
scientific scholars alike have expressed skepticism about the ability of these programs, as 
currently designed and implemented, to counter development with restoration in ways that 
achieve true “neutrality” in biodiversity levels.  Whether or not their challenges suggest that 
such programs should be abolished or merely redesigned remains a topic of active 
debate.147 
 
b. Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
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Lindenmayer, supra note 113, at 27 (finding that the poor track record of compliance with offsets programs 
extends beyond WMB); Maron et al., supra note 59, at 143 (finding a “lack of positive evaluations of ecological 
outcomes” across biodiversity offsetting programs).  
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 Compare Gibbons & Lindenmayer, supra note 113, at 26 (concluding that offsets are a “useful policy 
instrument” where governments plan to allow some land clearing any event), with Walker et al., supra note 
12, at 149 (concluding that achievement of “no net loss” policies through offset regimes is “administratively 
improbable and technically unrealistic”); Burgin, supra note 112, at 814 (finding that the biodiversity offsets 
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underpinning”); Robertson, supra note 123, at 366 (“[T]he story of banking…is the story of an extremely 
motivated group of capitalists using highly sophisticated ecological arguments to catch a ride on the larger 
neoliberal project of expanding market relations.”). 
 26 
 REDD+ is the UNFCCC program focused on sequestering carbon in forests.  
Addressing forest carbon harbors tremendous potential for addressing climate change, as 
deforestation represents around fifteen percent of global carbon emissions.148  However, 
unlike WMB, REDD+ is far from an established program with a track record to evaluate; 
instead, it is very much a work in progress. But while in some ways this makes it less ideal as 
a case study, REDD+’s slow evolution from theory to implementation itself offers some 
important lessons for LDNW.  Moreover, REDD+’s implementation has received a 
tremendous amount of scholarly attention, much of which focuses on issues also relevant to 
LDNW. 
 The basic concept of REDD+ is straightforward: deforestation represents a large 
source of carbon emissions that can be prevented or reversed relatively cheaply, as 
compared to cutting industrialized country emissions.149  Therefore, countries or companies 
in the developed world who wish to reduce their overall carbon emissions “footprint” may 
pay for forests to be preserved or planted instead of making cuts in their own emissions.150  
This desire to “neutralize” developed country emissions with developing country forest 
preservation forms the underpinning and impetus for REDD+.151   
 However, implementation of this concept has proven “neither fast, nor easy.”152  
International climate negotiators first discussed the idea of REDD during the 2005 
Conference of the Parties for the UNFCCC in Montreal, where it received wide support at 
least in broad-brush form.153  Two years later, UNFCC parties agreed to the “Bali Roadmap,” 
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422 (2013) 
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151
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 Peter J. Kanowski et al., Implementing REDD+: Lessons from analysis of forest governance, 14 ENVTL. SCI. & 
POL’Y 111, 113 (2011) (internal quotation omitted).   
153
 See UNFCCC Fact Sheet, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to 
Stimulate Action (Feb. 2011), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/fact_sheet_reducing_emissions_from_deforestat
ion.pdf (“At the eleventh session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) (Montreal, 2005) talks on reducing 
emissions from deforestation in developing countries began, with a proposal on the issue by Papua New 
Guinea and Costa Rica.”). 
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which created a timeline for the development of an international REDD proposal.154 REDD 
also became REDD+, as UNFCCC parties agreed to include within the program not only 
preservation and reduced deforestation, but also efforts to improve forest management 
and enhance forest carbon stocks.155 Since Bali, and with notable progress at the 2010 
Conference of the Parties in Cancun, the international community has slowly designed and 
begun to implement a framework for REDD+.156  Hopes remain high that REDD+ can play an 
important role in the new climate regime anticipated in 2015,157 delivering significant 
sustainable development finance to developing countries.158 
REDD+ activities are now being carried out by a multiplicity of actors, with the 
United Nations’ REDD Programme taking a leading role along with the Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF)159 and the World Bank’s Forest Investment Program.160  The 
UNFCCC encourages a three-phased approach to REDD+ implementation: Phases 1 and 2 
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 The Bali Roadmap is primarily memorialized in the Bali Action Plan, United Nations, Bali Action Plan 
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governance, 14 ENVTL. SCIENCE & POL’Y 100, 101 (2011); Esteve Corbera & Heike Schroder, Governing and 
implementing REDD+, 14 ENVTL. SCIENCE & POL’Y 89, 90-91 (2011). 
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focus on “readiness” activities,161 while Phase 3 will deliver a “results-based” REDD+ (with 
funding contingent upon demonstrated emissions reductions).162  Most current REDD+ 
funding is for readiness activities, which aim to prepare nations to participate in an eventual 
international REDD+ market. Such funding takes the form of grants, concessional loans, and 
technical assistance.163  In this way, REDD+ readiness funding conforms to the traditional 
model of country-to-country foreign aid, although several multilateral funds have also been 
established.164  Readiness activities include development of national or local capacity for 
land-cover change monitoring, governance reforms, and more discrete promises like logging 
moratoria.165  The breadth of these targeted governance reforms suggests that “the policy 
and institutional reforms necessary for successful implementation of REDD+ will be 
substantial.”166 
Significant financing has already been pledged and delivered for REDD+ readiness 
activities, with donor countries and international institutions dispensing a total of over $5 
billion in REDD+ funding to 49 countries.167  While not yet tied explicitly to demonstrated 
emissions reductions, most funding has at least been contingent on the demonstration of 
“meaningful mitigation actions and transparency in implementation.”168 
In addition to these national-scale REDD+ readiness activities, there are also many 
pilot and demonstration projects underway, particularly in East Asia and the Pacific and 
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59 (detailing Indonesia’s agreement to implement a logging moratorium as a condition of receiving $1 billion 
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 Kanowski et al., supra note 152, at 113. 
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 Takacs, supra note 148, at 690. 
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Amazon regions, which are occurring independently from the national-scale activities.169  
These are implemented by a variety of actors: local communities, private developers, 
government entities, or landowners.170  These pilots, along with the readiness activities, are 
intended to pave the way to Phase 3 of REDD+, which will entail “rigorous quantification” of 
emissions reductions as the prerequisite for funding.171  Such emissions reductions could be 
demonstrated on a project-by-project basis, or over a larger area, such as a national or 
regional-level effort to halt or reverse deforestation trends.172  Ultimately, given the ways in 
which REDD+ projects may adversely influence land use patterns beyond their immediate 
boundaries, some experts predict—and many advocate for—more future activity at national 
scales, rather than at localized levels.173  Others have suggested “nested” governance 
approaches, where state-based measures might be integrated with bottom-up and public-
private initiatives.174  How precisely such integration might occur remains unclear, and the 
future permissibility of various scales of activity may be determined by upcoming climate 
negotiations and/or convergence around a particular set of measurement, monitoring, and 
verification protocols, which will be necessary to ensure that Phase 3 results in real 
emissions reductions.175   Similarly, open questions remain over how and when the 
transition will occur from Phases 1 and 2 of REDD+ to Phase 3, where the bulk of REDD+ 
funding is expected to materialize.176  Only a handful of countries are currently receiving 
results-based financing of the type envisioned in Phase 3.177 
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Even in these early stages, credits generated by REDD+ projects can be, and are 
being, sold within both voluntary and compliance carbon markets.178 The forestry carbon 
offset market was worth $216 million in 2013, with 95% of this value transacted in the 
voluntary market (where demand is driven by private sector buyers fulfilling corporate 
social responsibility pledges).179 REDD+ credits made up about $70 million of this market, 
meaning that for the present time donor country funds for REDD+ readiness dwarf private 
actors’ market-based contributions.180  Carbon compliance markets generally have tight 
restrictions on the REDD+ credits that qualify,181 suggesting that these markets do not view 
many of the credits being transacted on the voluntary market sufficiently reliable to be 
included within a mandatory regime.182  
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As REDD+ proceeds, major ideological and practical concerns have emerged around 
how to best implement the program’s intended goal of carbon neutrality through 
developing country forest offsetting of developed country emissions.  Most significantly, 
there is robust disagreement over whether REDD+ should pursue a market-based approach; 
how real emissions reductions can be assured in ways acceptable to all parties; and whether 
REDD+ is capable of being implemented in ways that respect community involvement and 
promote equity and justice. These concerns are quite similar to some of the main concerns 
likely to be raised as LDNW proceeds.   
The first major issue REDD+ actors are grappling with is whether or not the ultimate 
form that REDD+ takes should be a market-driven regime.183  There is general agreement 
that the long-term goal for REDD+ is to move to something beyond foreign-aid like 
assistance, but this does not lead inexorably to the conclusion that a private-actor, market-
driven model is the best way forward.184  Instead, there are a number of forms a results-
based REDD+ might take: in addition to a pure market approach, where buyers are 
predominantly private parties and sellers are predominantly the owners of forests, there 
might be national funds, run in or outside of current national administrations, which collect 
international finance money and guarantee on-the-ground emissions reductions results; or 
funding might occur in the form of “conditional budget support,” where countries are 
awarded more generalized funding in exchange for demonstrated results. 185  Recent 
research also suggests that funding might focus more on fostering and nurturing existing 
commitments and rules of sovereign governments, as many countries have reasonably good 
forestry laws that are simply not enforced.186   
In these fund-driven models, both developed countries and private entities might 
supply financing, although there are questions over whether such designs would be likely to 
                                                                                                                                                                            
address through the creation of “gold standard” carbon credits, which certify that the credits were produced 
in a “premium” manner that should ensure additionality.  The market has shown a fair amount of demand for 
such premium credits.  See generally Boyd & Salzman, supra note 178.  
183
 Vatn & Vedeld, supra note supra note 149, at 422 (noting that a market-based approach to REDD+ is 
controversial and comparing various governance options available at the national level); see also Phelps, 
Webb & Agrawal, supra note 173, at 312 (expressing concern that REDD+ threatens to recentralize forest 
governance due to strict requirements necessary for market participation). 
184
 Neeff, Göhler & Ascui, supra note 158, at 160; Chhatre et al., supra note 156, at 654 (concluding that while 
the international discussion around REDD+ has “endeavored to construct REDD+ in the image of a pure market 
model,” in reality the program is “likely to involve complex pathways to eventual reductions in net 
deforestation, driven by the agendas of multiple actors whose interactions are governed by a suite of 
institutions beyond the putative carbon market”). 
185
 Vatn & Vedeld, supra note 149, at 422, 424. As Vatn and Vedeld note, however, there is plenty of 
developing country resentment over the conditional support model, and strict performance-based 
conditionalities may reduce the will of host countries to participate in the REDD+ scheme.  Id. at 428.     
186
 Kanowski et al., supra note 152, at 111. 
 32 
attract as much private finance as a pure market approach.187  Each of these models has 
benefits and drawbacks relevant to LDNW, which are discussed in the following section. 
A second major challenge in REDD+ implementation has been the design of robust 
but practicable regimes to ensure that emissions reductions claimed from the forest sector 
actually occur, and that they achieve an acceptable level of permanency.188  “Leakage” of 
forest emissions—where emissions are reduced in one location, only to cause deforestation 
or degradation in another, unmonitored location—is a significant concern (and one that has 
driven many of the calls for national, or at least regional, scales of implementation).189  
Similarly, “additionality” is also of critical importance, meaning that developed countries 
want to “pay only for changes in carbon stocks that would not otherwise have taken 
place.”190  Measuring whether or not changes are “additional” requires the establishment of 
baselines from whence to measure change—another issue that has been fraught with 
methodological debates. REDD+ baselines are particularly challenging because they must 
measure forward-looking “business as usual”—that is, what national forest emissions 
and/or deforestation would have been expected to be, in the future, in the absence of 
REDD+.191  These predictions are extremely hard to construct because of the “complexity of 
forest-cover change” and the “sheer number of forest-cover change drivers.”192 To help 
ensure that these REDD+ methodological challenges are properly addressed, developed 
countries are pushing for the adoption of internationally overseen monitoring, reporting, 
and verification (MRV) regimes.193  Developing countries, on the other hand, want to ensure 
that such international regimes do not infringe upon their sovereign rights, though they are 
mindful that they must accede to a regime stringent enough to guarantee the funding flows 
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they desire.194  MRV debates are also intricately linked to the question of what the goals of 
REDD+ are, as MRV parameters should be designed to measure performance objectives.195 
This issue of just what the goals of REDD+ are brings us to the third and most 
vociferous debate raised over the REDD+ carbon neutrality framework. While REDD+ has a 
clear mission to reduce carbon, most participants—and particularly developing country 
participants—envision it as having more than a single-minded focus on carbon neutrality, 
which would call for strategic targeting of the cheapest, most carbon-rich forest assets.196  
Ideally, REDD+ should facilitate a “triple win,” with improved forest management 
contributing to the goals of carbon reduction, poverty alleviation, and biodiversity 
protection.197  Otherwise, REDD+ risks being, in the words of one scholar, “anti-democratic, 
Northern self-interested, and human-rights impairing.”198 
In recognition of REDD+’s broader goals, parties to the UNFCCC agreed in Cancun in 
2010 to include an annex on REDD+ “safeguards,” which parties will “promote” and 
“support.”199  These safeguards include commitments to make REDD+ activities “country-
driven” and consistent with “environmental integrity” and “sustainable development needs 
and goals,” and to support “transparent and effective” governance structures and respect 
indigenous rights, local communities, and biodiversity conservation.200 While most saw this 
annex as a good first step, serious questions remain over what further steps need to be 
taken to guarantee full integration of biodiversity and development goals into REDD+.201  
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Similarly, persistent doubts linger about whether REDD+ frameworks will in practice fully 
respect indigenous and local rights, including non-Western notions of property, or will 
adequately embrace the participatory norms called for in the Cancun Agreement.202  These 
concerns are also likely to play a central role in LDNW implementation, as discussed further 
in the following section.   
It remains to be seen whether REDD+ will prove the kind of comprehensive 
sustainable development and environmental management strategy desired by developing 
countries.  Its future will depend in no small part on the role assigned to it under the new 
international climate change mitigation regime, expected to be agreed to at the 2015 
UNFCCC Conference of the Parties in Paris, France.203  In the meantime, however, some are 
hopeful that even without an overarching international REDD+ framework, “local 
communities can harness the global discourse on safeguards in REDD+ to their advantage in 
local and national arenas, without waiting for an international consensus on the 
architecture of REDD+.”204  That is to say, REDD+ may already be having a positive impact on 
national and local discourses and actions, irrespective of the ultimate shape that the ‘Phase 
3’ regime assumes—a type of early benefit that LDNW developers might also want to foster. 
 
IV. DESIGNING LDNW FOR INTEGRITY  
In comparison to WMB and REDD+, LDNW has enormously ambitious aims.  
Whereas WMB focuses exclusively on wetlands and REDD+ exclusively on forests, LDNW 
capaciously includes all types of land degradation within its purview.  Similarly, whereas 
WMB focuses specifically on preserving ecological functions, and REDD+ at least nominally 
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focuses on carbon sequestration,205 LDNW aims to neutralize land degradation in order to 
advance a suite of social, economic, and environmental policy goals.206  But LDNW’s broader 
focus also suggests that a tremendous amount of knowledge might be gleaned from each of 
these smaller (and still ambitious) attempts to implement a version of land neutrality.  To 
advance this contention, this section highlights three major issues and suggests how LDNW 
can learn from past attempts to construct a program with scientific and legal integrity.   
 
a. Defining and Measuring Degradation 
One of the major first challenges that an LDNW framework will need to tackle is the 
translation of its broad definition of land degradation into meaningful measurements—
often called “indicators” in institutional parlance—that represent its multifaceted goals. As 
both WMB and REDD+ illustrate, the way that the scientific/social problem at issue is 
translated into legal terms has profound impacts on what is considered as “success” and 
how well this accords with a program’s original aims.   
In its current conceptual form, LDNW leaves major decisions over the definition of 
“land degradation” unarticulated.  But definitional fuzziness, which has already proven a 
challenge in the implementation of the UNCCD,207 will prove considerably more problematic 
in a regime committed to “neutralizing” degradation, as the concept necessarily implies a 
netting of all losses and gains. Land degradation’s current definition includes “reduction or 
loss of the biological or economic productivity and complexity of [land].”208  Such a 
capacious definition assists in uniting parties with potentially different driving concerns—
biodiversity loss, ecosystem preservation, economic development, etc.—but it may well 
detract from the program’s ability to measure degradation at a level of specificity 
acceptable for establishing progress towards neutrality. 
One initial question regarding land degradation measurement is whether 
degradation should be made into a binary concept that allows land to be categorized as 
either “degraded” or “not degraded” for netting purposes. If so, much nuance will be lost in 
the translation, given that land may be in various stages of degradation, with severe 
degradation of more concern than mild.  If a binary framework is rejected, considerable 
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complications will arise regarding how various degrees of degradation and restoration are 
factored into an overall measure of “neutrality.” 
REDD+ has skirted this problem in part by focusing its neutrality framework specifically 
on carbon, a single variable where “a ton is a ton”209 and forests are labeled by their 
strength as “carbon repositories.”210  In this way, degrees of forest degradation obtain an 
objective scientific measure.  In contrast, WMB has had to confront head on the 
complicated question of assigning degrees of value to wetlands, and it has struggled to do 
so.211  Some WMB practitioners have developed algorithms that use “easily measured site 
characteristics to make inferences about harder-to-measure ‘wetland functions,’” turning 
these into numeric scores that rank a wetland’s value.212  But even within this single 
domestic program focused exclusively on wetlands, use of these more rigorous systems to 
attempt to rank various parcels of land has been spotty, and wetlands have mostly been 
traded on the basis of acreage because it serves as a cheap and easy proxy.213  As this 
experience suggests, LDNW will want to think carefully about whether and how to define 
degradation either in shades of black and white or along a spectrum that is meaningful 
without being overly onerous.   
  More fundamentally, additional definitional clarity will be critical to understanding 
how land is to be measured and classified in an LDNW scheme. As a starting point, more 
precision on the goals of land degradation neutrality is important.  Ongoing REDD+ and 
WMB debates about the goals of those programs suggest that early, frank discussion of 
program goals should ideally underpin legal definitions and frameworks, and that failure to 
reach early resolution on these issues is likely to lead to implementation controversies 
down the road.214  Moreover, in the case of WMB, selection of inappropriate proxies to 
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serve as the measure of program success has done more than merely stir up controversy: it 
has caused a program that appears successful on paper in terms of achieving “no net loss” 
to fail on the true goal of delivering functionally equivalent wetlands.215    
There have already been myriad efforts to define and quantify land degradation, but 
as one recent critique described: 
 
Most of these studies have focused on deforestation, overgrazing, salinization, soil 
erosion, and other visible forms of land degradation rather than on the degradation 
of less visible characteristics of soils (e.g. carbon content, top soil depth, etc.) or the 
less direct consequences of land degradation such as human suffering and the loss 
of ecosystem services.216 
 
These discrete scientific measurements stand in contrast to the broad goals articulated in 
documents setting forth the LDNW vision, where land is presented as a “nexus issue” 
uniting concerns around energy, food, water, climate, and biodiversity.217  LDNW enshrines 
the diverse objectives of both agricultural intensification and preservation of non-
agricultural lands.218  To encompass this diversity, LDNW program design will have to reach 
some level of consensus over how to balance these goals.  Moreover, LDNW’s expansive 
social and environmental objectives suggest that attention should be paid at the definitional 
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phase to distributional equity and ensuring that LDNW works to the benefit of local 
populations to proactively address some of REDD+’s controversies.219 The ongoing process 
of selecting “indicators” to serve as measurements for the state of desertification under the 
UNCCD may provide a helpful departure point for this conversation.220  The UNCCD 
indicators combine more ecological units (e.g., “proportion of change in each land use 
category to another per unit of time,” and “biodiversity condition of a region relative to a 
‘pristine’ state”) with explicit measures of poverty (“proportion of the population in 
affected areas living above the poverty line”) and other measures of development (e.g., the 
Human Development Index as a measure of “approximate status and change in the 
wellbeing of populations”).221  However, reaching agreement on these desertification 
indicators was a long, fractious process and full implementation of these measurements still 
appears years away.222  To expedite a similar process for LDNW, one way forward might be 
to develop a simpler set of universal indicators that all regions and countries will use, and 
then allow flexibility in selecting additional regionally specific ones, at least in early stages of 
implementation. Such a strategy would avoid the need for worldwide consensus on a set of 
complete measurements and allow for experimentation as to what measures best ensure 
success.  
 The definitions and measurement “indicators” selected for land degradation will 
filter into the next critical step for the success of an LDNW framework, which has proven an 
Achilles heel of desertification policy and REDD+ to date: establishing baselines from 
whence the rate of change can be measured.223  As in REDD+, baselines will be scientifically 
challenging to assess, because they will necessarily require parsing persistent degradation 
from temporary fluctuations.   And frustratingly, the more LDNW is able to encapsulate its 
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broad goals within its measurement of success by choosing a robust set of social and 
economic indicators of land degradation, the harder the problem will then become to 
quantify and measure.224  Similarly, as with REDD+, questions are sure to arise over the 
extent to which baseline methodologies should be universal or tailored to regional or 
national situations.225 These challenges will not make the process an easy one, and likely 
any methodologies selected will remain susceptible to some criticism.  Nevertheless, to 
bolster accountability and attract funding, considerable emphasis should be placed on the 
establishment of scientifically defensible, even if imperfect, baselines worldwide as a critical 
first step in LDNW.  Again, universal guidelines coupled with regional experimentation may 
provide an early path forward that maintains integrity without requiring unanimity at a 
stage where it may be detrimental to progress.   
 Beyond definitional and baseline concerns, WMB and REDD+ are also instructive on 
the issue of designing monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) regimes.  To attract 
international finance, LDNW will need to follow REDD+’s efforts to construct a “good 
enough” MRV scheme; that is, one that satisfies the stringency criteria of international 
donors, while not proving so intrusive or expensive as to preclude its adoption by countries, 
localities, or project developers.226  In the case of LDNW, the MRV effort will have to include 
finding new ways to inject rigor into measuring progress on land degradation, in order to 
supply the accountability that the desertification regime has lacked to date.227  WMB’s 
troubled experience in securing long-term monitoring, combined with REDD+ concerns over 
permanency, also suggests that MRV scheme designers should think up-front about ways to 
emphasize long-term accountability in MRV processes.228  Designing pilot programs where 
funding is incremental and contingent upon certain demonstrated mile-markers of success 
might aid in determining how to successfully incentivize long-term LDNW MRV. One further 
point worth noting is that LDNW’s MRV need not necessarily be as exacting as REDD+’s, if 
the program is not intended to facilitate compliance with international carbon regimes, so 
                                                        
224
 Cf. Grainger, supra note 195, at 158 (noting the difficulty of finding comprehensive indicators also suitable 
to “practical monitoring”).  
225
 MADEIRA, supra note 150, at 11. 
226
 See Takacs, supra note 148, at 668 (suggesting that the key for REDD+ MRV has been to construct a regime 
“sufficiently rigorous to be meaningful, but cost-effective enough to be practical”). 
227
 See, e.g., Stringer et al., supra note 188, at 121 (noting that desertification has suffered from a lack of 
accurate accounting models, including deficient data and a lack of appropriate local monitoring methods or 
regional protocols).  Cf. Takacs, supra note 148, at 673 (noting that funding for REDD+ hinges on MMRV that 
accurately measures deforestation and reforestation rates).   
228
 See McKenney & Kiesecker, supra note 112, at 172 (WMB); Burgin, supra note 112, at 807, 813 (WMB); 
Takacs, supra note 148 (REDD+). 
 40 
long as MRV tracks reasonably well those measures that are important to the program’s 
success.229   
 In sum, the experiences of both REDD+ and WMB suggest that early, inclusive 
conversations over the purposes driving a neutrality-based land preservation scheme are 
critical to creating a program able to transform social and environmental goals into 
meaningful legal frameworks backed by best available scientific knowledge.  Program aims 
must filter down into definitions, measurements, and monitoring schemes in order to 
achieve not just compliance but on-the-ground success.  If LNDW is able to have productive 
early conversations and reach an acceptable level of basic consensus on a design that will 
ensure integrity of the worldwide goal, balanced by regional flexibility where appropriate, it 
can hopefully avoid some of the lengthy implementation challenges facing REDD+, as well as 
WMB’s failure to deliver on its “no net loss” goals.     
 
b. “Neutrality” as an Organizing Principle 
Several particular challenges arise with LDNW’s focus on “neutrality,” that is, the 
offsetting of land degradation losses with equivalent land restoration gains.230 We use 
“offset” here broadly, not intending to refer specifically to market-driven regimes, but to a 
program that relies on measuring losses against gains as its means of assessing 
performance.231  In this way, LNDW closely resembles the structure of WMB, which is 
similarly organized around a “no net loss” goal. In contrast, REDD+, although espousing a 
“neutrality” framework that permits developed country donors to claim credit for 
developing country forest carbon, differs somewhat in that it does not set a “no net loss” of 
forests goal.  It is the special challenge of no net land loss goals that we probe in this 
section.     
The first challenge of a “no net” program is that a certain measure of “equivalence” 
is embedded in the concept of land offsets that is extremely hard to achieve in practice.232  
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As WMB and other biodiversity offsetting schemes show, there is an inherent tendency in 
any offsetting scheme to replace higher-value land with lower-value land, and real difficulty 
in creating the kinds of long term incentives that will ensure that restoration persists.233  
Accordingly, even if LDNW does not adopt the kind of market-based trading program that 
WMB embodies, there will always be questions of whether land lost to degradation is, as a 
matter of scientific integrity, being counterbalanced with equal parcels of land being 
restored, even when paper compliance is achieved.  To complicate the picture, some recent 
research suggests that given the challenges of achieving “equivalency,” no net loss may be 
the wrong focus; focusing on achieving certain priorities maybe a more cost-effective way to 
determine what parcels of land should be used for offsetting.234 This point underscores the 
importance of creating robust definitions and MRV regimes that capture the most essential 
qualities that the LDNW program seeks to protect, as a way to guard against the almost 
inevitable erosion in value that will occur of any land characteristics that are not embedded 
within the scheme’s measurement and MRV systems. 
A “no net loss” structure also raises questions about the balance to be struck 
between preservation and restoration.  To be “land degradation neutral” suggests 
indifference to whether land is preserved or restored, so long as restoration keeps pace 
with degradation.235  But several factors should make us wary of constructing a legal 
framework that endorses this indifference.  The first is the tendency noted in the previous 
paragraph for functional value to be lost when certain degraded parcels are “offset” with 
the restoration of others.  This tendency suggests that in most cases, halting the initial 
degradation would have been more beneficial than permitting degradation accompanied by 
restoration.  The second factor that calls into question a program that imbeds no 
preference for preservation over restoration is the scientific challenge, discussed supra 
section one, of actually restoring degraded land.  Scientists are much more confident in the 
ability of certain land management practices to prevent degradation than they are of their 
ability to restore degraded land.236  All of these factors suggest that perhaps a premium 
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should be put on preservation—a premium that can be lost in a “no net” scheme like 
LDNW.237   
LDNW’s “no net degradation” focus combines with the breadth of its scope to raise 
another important question: because it covers multiple land types and demands neutrality 
within each of these,238 is the aim of LDNW to preserve each of these land types in precisely 
the quantities in which they now exist? Climate change is likely to prove a confounding 
factor that may make this goal impossible in many regions.  As the earth continues to warm, 
many regions will naturally239 evolve to have a different mix of ecosystems than they 
currently do—for example, the tropics are likely to get drier, while in the far north frozen 
tundra is expected to shrink.240  It therefore might be a fool’s errand to try to restore and 
maintain particular ecosystems at their current levels of productivity and expansiveness in 
the face of forces beyond local or national control.  
Regional variability highlights the broader challenge of geography.241  The goals of 
LDNW will not be accomplished if the whole of Africa sees severe land degradation, but 
Latin America achieves equal land restoration.242  Thus, as with WMB, LDNW will have to 
select appropriate geographical boundaries within which to net gains and losses.  Based on 
the particularities of the WMB scheme, the Corps chose in its refined version of WMB to 
emphasize a “watershed” approach to “no net loss,” instructing (though not commanding) 
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that offsets should occur within the same watershed as the wetlands lost.243 Similar 
discussion will need to take place in LDNW as to appropriate geographic areas over which to 
net out progress.  At the same time, REDD+ offers a different important tale regarding 
geography, which is that international financing is likely to flow to those countries best 
equipped to deliver and document results, which is a different set of countries from those 
that most need assistance in preserving their forests.244  Creators of the LDNW framework 
will also want to think carefully about how the scheme can be designed to maximize the fair 
distribution of benefits and funding worldwide.  
These complexities lead us to a suggestion that has been made in other contexts 
that LDNW might be wise to import245: encouraging the establishment of separate 
preservation and restoration goals, particularized to the appropriate scale.  Under the broad 
rubric of ensuring no net degradation, LDNW might encourage regions, countries, or 
localities to assess their land use patterns and history in order to determine what the 
appropriate mix among ecosystems and between preservation and restoration is for a given 
locale.  Then, the relevant entity could set appropriate, disaggregated targets for 
restoration and preservation.246  In this way, LDNW might achieve worldwide neutrality in 
land degradation when targets are amalgamated, without actually implying a potentially 
indefensible indifference to whether or where land is preserved or restored.  
 
c. Administering LDNW  
In this final subsection, we derive suggestions for how to administer a global, land-
focused neutrality program like LDNW from WMB and REDD+.  Three tensions predominate: 
the appropriate scale of projects, the role of the private sector, and the challenge of 
mobilizing funding.     
 
i. The Scale of Projects  
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 LDNW is framed as a global target, but with recognition that it will need to be 
broken down into somewhat smaller pieces, be that regional targets, national targets, or 
targets that are even more localized.   In determining how to proceed, debates over scale 
similar to those that have driven discussion of the REDD+ architecture are likely to arise.  
Perhaps even more so than in the forest context, land degradation policymakers have 
increasingly come to understand that both the causes and solutions to land degradation are 
highly localized, and to place a premium on local and traditional knowledge. But in the case 
of REDD+, many have expressed concern that the decentralization trend that has 
predominated forest governance more recently may be reversed by the push for national-
level policies, which have the advantage of better preventing leakage and thereby 
enhancing efficacy.247  Similar leakage concerns within an LDNW framework are likely to 
counsel against a highly localized strategy, as focusing on neutralizing degradation in one 
locality might have the undesirable consequence of causing land in neighboring, non-
participating localities to face steeper degradation pressures.248   
Accordingly, LDNW is likely to experience the same tension REDD+ has between 
local, participatory solutions capable of accomplishing multiple sustainable development 
objectives and protecting local populations from exploitation, and the desirability of 
national accountability frameworks.249  One possible direction forward for LDNW, suggested 
by the REDD+ experience, is to embrace the kind of pluralistic experimentalism that has 
propelled REDD+ forward in the face of this tension.  As described supra, REDD+ has 
allowed national- and local-level efforts to proceed in tandem, with the intention of possibly 
harmonizing these into some sort of “nested governance” approach down the road.250  
While this strategy offers little in the way of certainty, it might allow for much-needed 
experimentation on the question of what types of LDNW governance are likely to prove 
successful.  At the same time, LDNW drafters might consider early adoption of international 
                                                        
247
 See Phelps, Webb & Agrawal, supra note 173, at 312 (noting that a national approach is often considered 
“integral to the success” of REDD+ because it helps avoid leakage, ensure permanence, and create reliable 
MRV, but that it also makes national governments the primary forest stakeholders). 
248
 Cf. supra notes 122-127 and accompanying text (explaining that WMB also evolved out of an effort to end 
project-by-project wetlands restoration due to a perception that it was less effective and more difficult to 
manage and monitor). 
249
 Cf. Takacs, supra note 163, at 74 (arguing that local, meaningful, informed participation offers the “best 
means of warding off the [potential] negative impacts” of REDD+); Herrmann & Hutchinson, supra note 37, at 
550 (observing that most African countries are moving to a “bottom-up approach” to combating 
desertification, but that such approaches are “more difficult to reconcile with the terms of bilateral and 
multilateral funding than their top-down counterparts”). 
250
 See Kanowski et al., supra note 152. 
 45 
guidelines on local participation rights, to ward off later tensions around issues of 
decentralization and distributional equity.251  
ii. The Private Role 
Proponents of LDNW insist that it is not “a rationale for market-based offset or 
compensation schemes.”252 Nevertheless, LDNW will inevitably face the same tensions as 
WMB and REDD+ over the extent to which the program is to involve public versus private 
actors.253  It seems unlikely that LDNW will evolve to have the same sort of compliance 
market that predominates in WMB and is anticipated to ultimately predominate in REDD+, 
unless it were to pursue the strategy of trying to integrate into the international carbon 
marketplace.  This option is frequently discussed,254 although it presents major hurdles due 
to (1) the fact that forests contain far more carbon than other land types255; (2) the 
challenges of precisely measuring carbon sequestered over the long term through 
sustainable land management techniques rather than in the more tangible medium of 
trees;256 and (3) the risks associated with reducing land degradation management to a 
carbon reduction strategy alone, when it is intended as a broad livelihood-enhancing 
measure.257  On the flip side, carbon markets provide a revenue source that would 
undoubtedly be quite valuable in LDNW implementation, if these challenges could be 
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overcome or cabined in ways that didn’t otherwise compromise the integrity or 
manageability of the program.  One could also imagine that given LDNW’s diverse goals, 
some might call for a “credit stacking” approach, whereby the same parcel of land might 
participate in various credit markets that reward it for preserving different functions, 
although this is a relatively new concept that presents many risks.258 A full exploration of 
the role of environmental markets for LDNW is beyond the scope of this article, but merits 
discussion as LDNW gains momentum and takes further shape. 
Even if LDNW does not pursue a strategy of integrating into carbon markets, private 
actors might be involved in the program in several ways.  First, similar to some REDD+ 
countries, LDNW might pursue a national fund model, perhaps with financing contingent 
upon certain demonstrated actions, into which both developed country governments and 
private entities might donate.259  In this case, private finance would likely be generated 
primarily by corporate social responsibility commitments.260  This method of engagement 
with the private sector is likely to be the least lucrative and may never generate significant 
sums, but it would also be the safest in terms of insulating the program from the types of 
concerns that have accompanied private sector involvement in REDD+.261 
 A WMB model presents a second option for private sector engagement: national 
governments could use LDNW as an opportunity to shift domestic legal baselines to require 
developers of projects that would degrade certain land to engage in an equal amount of 
restoration.262  This strategy might be more difficult in the case of land degradation than 
wetlands infill, given degradation’s myriad causes and the diverse actors involved, but it 
might at least work to contain land degradation caused by major new developments.  Of 
course, such a scheme would also be subject to all the pitfalls of WMB and other 
biodiversity offsetting schemes, with restoration offsets unlikely to measure up to land 
degradation losses for reasons discussed supra.263  Nevertheless, given that most countries 
have a current baseline of no requirement of offsetting for developers, even less-than-
perfectly-successful domestic LDNW offsetting requirements might produce some gains.   
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Finally, one other option that LDNW could pursue to engage private actors is the 
creation—perhaps in conjunction with a leading non-profit—of a certification scheme for 
“land degradation neutrality.”  Certification could be awarded to corporations operating in 
developing countries that are verified to responsibly offset any land degradation they cause 
via local restoration projects (similar to schemes operating for forest management and 
carbon sequestration in other contexts).264  This strategy would again tackle only a subset of 
the causes of land degradation, but might be a worthwhile component of a larger program. 
It also, however, might involve risks of “greenwashing.” i.e., creation of a standard not 
backed by real achievements on the ground, if not well-managed.265  
These latter two options—domestic LDNW requirements codified into law, or a 
private certification scheme for corporate LDNW achievements—present many of the 
implementation risks that have riddled REDD+.  In asking corporations to engage in 
restoration work directly, it is possible that they may do so in ways not conducive to local 
participation or not in the best interest of all local stakeholders.266  Accordingly, in designing 
LDNW, plans for private participation should be accompanied by careful thinking about 
advance protections that might best help corporate partners engage with local communities 
in ways that ensure that their actions will achieve LDNW’s core goals.  Or, LDNW might also 
explore whether WMB’s “in lieu fee” alternative—where developers pay into government-
run funds instead of undertaking actions themselves—presents a more appropriate model 
in the land degradation context.267 
 
iii. The Financing Challenge  
Much like REDD+ (at least in its current early stages), LDNW is likely to attract a 
preponderance of its funding from developed country governments.  Will the LDNW 
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framing boost contributions from the disappointing levels achieved under the 
desertification regime?  We believe that a well-executed LDNW plan does indeed have this 
potential, precisely because of the UNCCD Secretariat’s observation that it “is strikingly 
clear and easy to communicate.”268  The clarity of the LDNW vision creates accountability—
one of the key factors missing in the desertification regime.269   
To facilitate this accountability, sufficiently reliable baselines will be a critical first 
step, and a challenging one. Although the desertification community has struggled in the 
past to develop baselines, ,270 promising new technologies are being developed on this 
front. As just one example, the Africa Soil Information Service has announced an innovative 
effort to develop a “standardized methodology for soil and land use monitoring and digital 
soil mapping . . . utiliz[ing] novel data collection methodologies that are efficient, cost-
effective, and vastly improve the analytical precision of the landscape level estimates.”271 
Strategic use of such rapidly developing technologies may enable LDNW to leapfrog some of 
the challenges encountered by past baseline establishment efforts.  And indeed, the new 
LDNW framework presents a tremendous opportunity for a new call to action for the 
international community, perhaps one framed around “LDNW readiness funding.” Such 
dedicated funding could be used to establish global and regional baseline methodologies 
and to apply these methodologies to create global and regional baselines from whence to 
commence action. Country- or locality-specific readiness funding might also be used to 
implement necessary governance reforms or run pilot projects, similar to REDD+.  REDD+ 
has proven quite successful in generating readiness funding that is tied explicitly to 
establishing baselines and building the governance and monitoring capacities necessary to 
move to results-based funding.  
Ultimately, it seems unlikely that LDNW will achieve the same financial proportions 
as REDD+, as it will never be able to promise the same scale of carbon reductions.  But 
LDNW’s strength lies in the multiplicity of its aims.  While not delivering the same carbon 
“punch” as forests, other land types certainly do have the ability to sequester carbon when 
well-managed.272  Similarly, LDNW may be able to serve as a crucial adaptation tool as 
climate change continues to transform and further degrade land.273 And as an anti-poverty, 
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rural empowerment tool, LDNW also addresses international security and migration issues 
that are of importance to donor countries.  It will be through this type of multi-faceted 
pitch, combined with a new framework and ability to monitor and measure progress, that 
LDNW might mobilize funding more successfully than its predecessor efforts.  Ultimately, 
though, the program’s ability to mobilize steady streams of funding will rest first upon 
creating strong legal and scientific foundations, capable of ensuring that legal definitions 
and measured variables equate with real success. 
A conversation must also be had about the international institutional mechanisms 
necessary to carry LDNW forward.  The UNCCD, to be sure, has played and might continue 
to play a crucial role, but its limited mandate will not allow for supervision and 
implementation of the type of expansive program it has articulated for LDNW. 274  
Nevertheless, actions within the scope of the UNCCD might also be a part of the pluralistic 
activities that drive LDNW forward—one could imagine, for example, a “No Net 
Desertification” goal and convention protocol as successfully clarifying and reorienting that 
convention in the same way that the LDNW goal is intended to function more broadly. 
Further research and discussion about institutional avenues forward is therefore important 
but not necessarily a crucial prerequisite to action. 
 
V. CONCLUSION: MOVING LDNW FORWARD, WITH INTEGRITY 
At this point, LDNW remains more of a vision than a reality.  The Rio+20 Outcome 
Document provides a foundation from which to proceed, but it is not yet clear how much 
further traction LDNW can secure, or whether it is the right pathway forward.  We feel 
cautiously optimistic, however, that if well designed, it would represent an advancement in 
desertification policy and land policy more generally.  Implementing an LDNW regime is 
unlikely to rapidly escalate land degradation up the world’s agenda or to quickly transform 
an ailing governance framework into a robust and effective one.  Nevertheless, it holds 
much promise, in part because there is such universal agreement that the current efforts to 
combat desertification and land degradation are struggling and insufficient.  Certainly, there 
is some risk in broadening the focus away from desertification alone, to include all land 
types within a single program’s goal. On the other hand, LDNW also offers an important 
crystallization of the concept of land as central to a number of development objectives, 
which may help attract funding that otherwise might not have gone specifically to 
desertification.  Moreover, a neutrality framework—challenging as it may be in some 
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ways—offers the distinct advantage of requiring, as a prerequisite for any ability to claim 
success, a more rigorous assessment and quantification of the state of land degradation in 
the world currently.  To be sure, such an assessment will prove difficult and is likely to be 
imperfect, but it will nevertheless be an important first step to building accountability into 
the land degradation management regime that in turn unlocks more international funding.   
The examples of REDD+ and WMB do not allow for enthusiastic endorsement of 
“neutrality”-framed land management programs.  “To neutralize” requires consensus 
around, and reasonable measurements of, what is gained and what is lost in ways that have 
proven ecologically and practically challenging for both programs, for diverse sets of 
reasons that we have explored.  But these efforts have also laid the groundwork for the 
next generation of such programs to proceed with greater knowledge of how to design with 
integrity, for success.  While we would not recommend importing such models into contexts 
where the status quo is adequate but imperfect, land degradation offers (if the pun can be 
excused) fertile ground for experimentation in reframing and reorganizing development 
targets and agendas, given the persistent decline in land quality under current policies. 
REDD+ and WMB’s lessons, if heeded, will hopefully allow LDNW to take the best and leave 
the worst of their models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
